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Happiness	   is	   the	  meaning	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	   life;	   the	  whole	  aim	  and	  end	  of	  
human	  existence.1	   This	   study	   seeks	   to	   jurisprudentially	   analyse	   the	   statutory	  
English	   laws	   relating	   to	   assisted	   suicide,	   so	   as	   to	   advance	   a	   justifiable	   re-­‐
articulation	   of	   their	   moral	   framework.	   Currently	   based	   on	   emotionless	  
principles,	   that	   framework	   necessarily	   denies	   ethics.	   Particular	   attention	   is	  
paid	   to	   a	   conceptual	   study	   of	   assisted	   suicide	   and	   particularly	   the	   notion	   of	  
‘assistance’.	   This	   analysis	   is	   made	   against	   a	   background	   of	   the	   traditional	  
Natural	   Law,	  which	   is	   supported	  as	   the	  correct,	  albeit	  under-­‐developed	   legal	  
theory	   defining	   the	   scope	   and	   logic	   of	   English	   suicide	   laws.	   Knowledge	   and	  
reason	  jointly	  constitute	  the	  correct	  yardstick	  by	  which	  morality	  and	  therefore	  
justice	   in	   this	   area	   should	   be	   measured;	   not	   solely	   the	   latter.	   The	   re-­‐
articulation	   of	   this	   framework	   shall	   be	   primarily	   achieved	   by	   resurrecting	  
human	   emotions	   through	   a	   study	   of	   fine	   art,	   supported	   by	   English	   common	  
law	  developments	  so	  as	  to	  distinguish	  various	  extra-­‐jurisdictional	  anomalies.	  It	  
shall	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  laws	  in	  this	  area,	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  enacted,	  are	  
immoral	   and	   therefore	   unjust	   and	   legalisation	   through	   Parliament	   (with	   the	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As	  humans	  we	  are	  emotional	  and	  rational	  beings.	  I	  also	  concede	  that	  we	  can	  
value	  emotions.	  A	   ‘right	  valuing’	  of	  emotions	  can	  say	   ‘I	  want	  to	  die’	  and	  the	  
humane	   response	   is	   to	   help	   me.	   I	   would	   not	   want	   to	   suffer.	   How	   dare	  
Professor	  Finnis	  compel	  me	  to	  suffer	  because	  he	  has	  a	  religious	  belief	  and	  it	  is	  
good	  for	  my	  (non-­‐existent)	  immortal	  soul?2	  
As	  it	  is	  currently	  enacted,	  s	  2(1)	  of	  the	  Suicide	  Act	  1961	  provides	  that	  it	  
is	  a	  criminal	  offence	   in	  England	  and	  Wales	   to	   ‘aid,	  abet,	   counsel,	  or	  procure	  
the	   suicide	   of	   another’,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   previous	   law,	   whereby	  
suicide	  itself	  was	  a	  crime,	  has	  been	  abrogated.3	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  this	  rather	  
illogical	  concept	  of	  illegality	  in	  assisting	  an	  essentially	  legal	  act	  is	  what	  breeds	  
recurring	  questions	   and	  doubts	   as	   to	   the	  morality	   and	  ethics	   in	   this	   area	  of	  
law.	   The	   statutory	   prohibition	   is	   a	   hard	   and	   fast	   rule,	   permitting	   no	  
manoeuvre	  on	  grounds	  of	  compassion,	  sympathy	  or	   love,	   in	  allowing	  one	  to	  
assist	  in	  the	  dignified	  death	  of	  an	  individual	  seeking	  it,	  at	  a	  time	  before	  living	  
becomes	   unbearable.	   The	   most	   a	   desperate	   Briton	   can	   do	   in	   pursuance	   of	  
their	   liberty	   and	   right	   of	   self-­‐determination	   in	   having	   their	   family	   or	   friends	  
assist	  in	  ending	  their	  suffering	  is	  to	  flee	  to	  the	  ironically	  named	  Dignitas	  Clinic4	  
in	  Switzerland,5	  to	  obtain	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  dignified	  departure	  from	  this	  
life.	   At	   best,	   a	   loved	   one	  might	   accompany	   their	   friend	   or	   relative	   on	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Statement	  by	  Professor	  Robert	  A	  Watt	  (Personal	  email	  correspondence	  24	  January	  2013)	  
3	  The	  Suicide	  Act	  1961,	  s	  1	  
4	  <http://www.dignitas.ch/>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
5	  And,	  most	  recently,	  in	  Germany,	  see	  <http://assisted-­‐dying.org/blog/2007/06/24/swiss-­‐dignitas-­‐expands-­‐to-­‐germany/>	  
accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
The English Laws Relating to Assisted Suicide 	  
	  	  
3	  
final	   journey,	  only	  to	  face	  an	  uncertain	  and	  inconsistent	  body	  of	  case	  law	  on	  
their	   return,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	   incarcerate	   them.6	  At	  worst,	   said	  Briton	  
will	   continue	   to	   suffer	   the	  unimaginable	  horrors	  of	   tragic	   conditions	   such	  as	  
locked-­‐in	  syndrome7	  or	  Progressive	  Multiple	  Sclerosis,8	  only	  to	  succumb	  to	  a	  
painful,	   humiliating	   death.	   The	   question	   begged	   is	   why,	   in	   a	   society	   so	  
apparently	  concerned	  for	  human	  rights,	  might	  an	   individual	  be	  permitted	  by	  
law	  to	  take	  their	  own	  life	  but	  their	  assistant	  be	  legally	  implicated	  for	  as	  little	  
as	   acquiescing	   to	   their	   final	   request	   to	   help	   them	   ‘take	   the	   exit	   they	   don’t	  
have	  the	  means	  to	  go	  through	  by	  themselves’?9	  	  
The	   issue,	   as	   is	   so	   often	   the	   case,	   is	   a	   great	   deal	   more	   than	   that	  
publicised	   in	   the	   media;	   the	   sanctity	   of	   life	   versus	   personal	   autonomy	  
dichotomy.	  Whilst	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   religious	   and	   freedom	   of	   choice	  
arguments	  dominate	  the	  public	  arena,10	  it	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  these	  rules,	  the	  
heart	   of	   the	   legal	   framework	   itself	   prohibiting	   assisted	   suicide	  which	   is	   the	  
culprit.	  Legislators	  have	  failed	  to	  take	  their	  time.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  R	  (Purdy)	  v.	  DPP	  [2009]	  UKHL	  45	  (Purdy).	  See	  <http://www.dignityindying.org.uk/personal-­‐stories/uk/yorkshire-­‐the-­‐
humber/bradford/debbie-­‐purdy-­‐story-­‐7.html>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
7	  R	  (on	  the	  application	  of	  Nicklinson)	  v.	  Ministry	  of	  Justice)	  [2012]	  EWHC	  2381	  (Admin)	  (Nicklinson).	  For	  insight	  into	  the	  
enduring	  suffering	  of	  this	  illness,	  see	  Nicklinson’s	  reaction	  to	  the	  High	  Court’s	  verdict:	  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-­‐news/lockedin-­‐syndrome-­‐sufferers-­‐lose-­‐legal-­‐challenge-­‐over-­‐assisted-­‐
dying-­‐8053451.html>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
8	  Purdy	  [2008]	  UKHL	  45	  
9	  Julian	  Baggini,	  ‘Individuals?	  Or	  members	  of	  society?’,	  The	  Independent	  (17	  August	  2012)	  
10	  Though	  see	  the	  apparent	  shift	  in	  certain	  religious	  attitudes:	  ‘Assisted	  Suicide	  Supported	  by	  Religious	  Britons’,	  BBC	  News	  
(1	  May	  2013)	  <	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐22362736>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
11	  Taking	  time	  to	  conceptually	  analyse	  the	  criminal	  sanctions	  prohibiting	  assisted	  suicide	  through	  both	  linguistic	  and	  artistic	  
philosophy	  is	  required.	  These	  concepts	  are	  discussed	  in	  Parts	  2	  and	  3.	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In	   an	   attempt	   to	   alter	   the	   UK’s	   inherently	   divine,	   Natural	   Law	  
framework,	   right-­‐to-­‐die	   campaigns	   such	   as	   Demos12	   have	   littered	   our	   press	  
over	   recent	   years	   in	   advocating	   their	   preferred	   ‘mechanisms	   of	   legal	  
change’:13	   compassion,	   dignity	   and	   autonomy	   (to	   mention	   a	   few).	   It	   could	  
even	  be	  said	  that	  public	  opinion	  is	  becoming	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  
assisting	  suicide	   in	   light	  of	   recent	  media	  contributions	  such	  as	   ‘Way	  to	  Go’14	  
and	   the	   Oscar-­‐winning	   ‘Amour’.15	   Additionally,	   there	   has	   been	   growing	  
support	   for	   movements	   such	   as	   Lord	   Falconer’s	   Commission	   on	   Assisted	  
Dying.16	  However,	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  attitudes,	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  any	  definitive	  
changes	   to	   the	   English	   laws	   in	   this	   area,	   so	   as	   to	   halt	   what	   can	   only	   be	  
described	  as	  a	  deteriorating	  respect	  for	  the	  value	  of	  human	  life.17	  	  
This	   paper	   will	   initiate	   its	   philosophical	   exploration	   of	   the	   laws	  
prohibiting	  assisted	  suicide	  by	  establishing,	  as	   far	  as	  possible,	  what	  the	   legal	  
understanding	   of	   notional	   ‘assistance’	   is.	   This	   will	   be	   followed	   by	   a	   critical	  
examination	   of	   these	   laws	   through	   the	   traditional	   and	   stoic	   Natural	   Law	   as	  
advocated	   by	   St	   Thomas	   Aquinas.18	  Whilst	   this	   will	   reveal	   an	   indestructible	  
resistance	   to	   the	   justification	   of	   laws	  permitting	  assisted	   suicide	   (confirming	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  <http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/commissiononassisteddying>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
13	  Penney	  Lewis,	  Assisted	  Dying	  and	  Legal	  Change	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2007)	  
14	  BBC	  3	  Comedy	  series,	  first	  broadcast	  January-­‐February	  2013.	  
15	  ‘Armour’,	  directed	  by	  Michael	  Haneke	  (2012).	  See	  	  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/nov/04/michael-­‐haneke-­‐
amour-­‐director-­‐interview>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
16	  The	  British	  Humanist	  Association	  <http://humanism.org.uk/campaigns/public-­‐ethical-­‐issues/assisted-­‐dying/>	  accessed	  1	  
May	  2013	  
17	  William	  Wagner,	  John	  S	  Kane	  and	  Lauren	  Prieb,	  ‘How	  Suicide	  Killing	  of	  Human	  Life	  Became	  a	  Human	  Right	  In	  the	  United	  
Kingdom’,	  Christian	  Concern	  (19	  October	  2010)	  4	  
<http://www.christianconcern.com/sites/default/files/docs/Assisted_Killing_Pamphlet.pdf>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
18	  1225	  –	  1274	  AD	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the	   inherent	   Natural	   foundation	   of	   our	   jurisdiction),	   further	   discussion	   will	  
sideline	   this	   error	   of	   logic	   by	   articulating	   a	   requirement	   of	   knowledge	   over	  
reason	  in	  a	  quest	  for	  true	  morality;	  that	  is,	  humanity’s	  true	  goal	  of	  ‘happiness’	  
as	   advanced	   by	   Aristotle.19	   This	   will	   be	   most	   usefully	   facilitated	   by	   an	  
exploration	  of	  two	  paintings	  by	  Poussin:20	  Landscape	  with	  a	  Storm	  (1651)	  and	  
Landscape	   with	   Pyramus	   and	   Thisbe	   (1651),	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   extract	   the	  
plausibility	  of	  emotion	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  knowledge	  within	  the	  Natural	  Law,	  
in	  agreement	  with	  Watt.21	   	  Moving	  onto	  a	  study	  of	   the	  common	   law	  courts’	  
treatment	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Suicide	  Act,	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  emotion	  
(as	  subtle	  as	  is	  it	  may	  be)	  will	  serve	  to	  expound	  a	  theory	  of	  our	  current	  legal	  
system	   which,	   as	   will	   be	   concluded,	   can	   be	   reformulated	   (and	   which,	  
incidentally,	   is	  already	  being	  seen	  to	  be	  done)	  so	  as	  to	  satisfy	  the	  traditional	  
Natural	   Lawyer	   on	   points	   of	   morality,	   whilst	   maintaining	   a	   necessary	   and	  
obligatory	  ought	  in	  legalising	  assisted	  suicide.	  	  
This	   paper’s	   brief	   linguistic	   study	   of	   notional	   ‘assistance’	   and	   artistic	  
investigation	  of	  emotion	  provide	  an	  alternate	  view	  of	   the	  Natural	   Lawyer	   in	  
the	   ongoing	   debate	   surrounding	   assisted	   suicide.	   This	   paper	  may	  make	   you	  
cry.	   Lawyers	   should	   cry	   –	   it	   helps	   us	   recognise	   wickedness.	   Herr	   Eichmann	  
behaved	  perfectly	  rationally	  when	  drawing	  up	  his	  timetables	  –	  when	  we	  think	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  (n1)	  
20	  1594	  –	  1665	  AD	  	  
21	  Robert	  A	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season	  and	  a	  Time	  To	  Every	  Purpose	  Under	  the	  Heaven	  –	  A	  Time	  to	  be	  Born	  and	  
a	  Time	  to	  Die:	  Natural	  Law,	  Emotion	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Die’	  (2012)	  24	  DLJ	  89	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of	  the	  innocent	  Jews	  and	  gypsies	  murdered	  by	  this	  foul	  man	  all	  we	  can	  do	  is	  
weep.	  That	  is	  the	  healthy	  response.22	  
	  
The	  Notion	  of	  ‘Assistance’:	  A	  Jurisprudential	  Enquiry	  
When	  one	  commits	  (or	  attempts	  to	  commit)	  suicide,	  there	  is	  no	  consequence	  
under	   the	   criminal	   law	   of	   England	   and	  Wales.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   other	  
rules	  of	   law	  will	  not	  be	  engaged,	  such	  as	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  mental	  health	  
services	   for	  example,23	  but	   it	   remains	   that	  an	   individual	  who	  has	  attempted	  
suicide	  will	  be	  free	  to	  continue	  life	  (or	  not	  as	  it	  may	  be)	  as	  they	  choose.	  How	  
then	   does	   the	   law	   justify	   a	   criminal	   sanction	   for	   the	   ‘assistance’	   of	   an	  
otherwise	   legal	   act?	   The	   answer	  must	   surely	   lie	   in	   how	   assistance	   is	   legally	  
defined	   and	   how	   it	   has	   been	   interpreted	   since	   its	   introduction	   into	   English	  
law.	  Before	  addressing	  these	  issues	  however,	   it	   is	   imperative	  to	   immediately	  
establish	  the	  difference	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  between	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  and	  
‘euthanasia’	  for	  the	  avoidance	  of	  any	  confusion24	  and	  to	  clarify	  that	  this	  paper	  
advocates	  only	  the	  former.25	  
For	   reasons	   of	   brevity,	   it	  will	   suffice	   to	   say	   that	   euthanasia	   is	   legally	  
understood	   in	   two	   forms:	   active	   euthanasia	   constituting	   a	   doctor’s	   positive	  
and	   deliberate	   act	   of	   bringing	   about	   a	   patient’s	   death	   (such	   as	   injecting	   a	  
deathly	   substance)26	   and	   passive	   euthanasia	   requiring	   the	   withdrawal	   or	  
withholding	   of	   treatment	   such	   as	   a	   life	   support	   system	   from	   one	   in	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Watt	  (Personal	  email	  correspondence)	  (n2)	  
23	  Notably	  sectioning:	  under	  ss	  2	  or	  3	  of	  the	  Mental	  Health	  Act	  2007	  
24	  Many	  academic	  opinions	  from	  outside	  our	  jurisdiction	  refer	  to	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  but	  not	  as	  it	  is	  defined	  in	  English	  law	  
25	  Though	  the	  author	  in	  fact	  advocates	  euthanasia,	  it	  rests	  outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  this	  paper	  
26	  R	  v	  Cox	  (1992)	  12	  BMLR	  38	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persistent	   vegetative	   state	   (PVS).27	   This	   paper	   neither	   advocates	   nor	  
condemns	  such	  action	  or	   inaction.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  we	  find	  
‘assisted	  suicide’	  which	  necessarily	  precludes	  any	  act	  of	  an	  individual	  in	  killing	  
the	   victim;	   one	   acts	   only	   to	   aid,	   abet,	   counsel	   or	   procure28	   the	   suicide	   of	  
another	   (which,	   incidentally,	   may	   be	   constituted	   by	   an	   omission).29	   The	  
confusion	   between	   this	   and	   euthanasia	   is	   most	   commonly	   found	   in	   the	  
branding	   of	   active	   euthanasia	   as	   ‘physician-­‐assisted	   suicide’	   (PAS)	   in	  
jurisdictions	   such	   as	   the	   Netherlands30	   and	   the	   USA,31	   which	   tends	   to	  
misrepresent	  the	  English	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘assisted’.32	  In	  summary,	  the	  notion	  
of	   ‘assistance’	   in	   English	   suicide	   laws	   (and	   English	   laws	   in	   general	   which	  
denote	   secondary	   liability)	   is	   essentially	   a	   doctrine	   of	   omission	   rather	   than	  
action;	   punishment	   for	   failing	   to	   prevent	   an	   act,	   per	   se.33	   It	   is	   noted	   that	  
though	  ‘assistance’	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  Suicide	  Act	  1961,	  it	  is	  loosely	  used	  
in	   the	   legal	   sector	   to	   connote	   ‘complicity’	   (per	   s	   2	   of	   the	   Act).34	   The	   Law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Airdale	  NHS	  Trust	  v	  Bland	  [1993]	  1	  All	  ER	  821	  
28	  The	  Suicide	  Act	  1961,	  s	  1	  
29	  See	  below	  
30	  For	  a	  descriptive	  account	  of	  the	  Dutch	  laws	  in	  this	  area,	  see	  Hilde	  Buiting	  et	  al,	  ‘Reporting	  of	  Euthanasia	  and	  Physician-­‐
Assisted	  Suicide	  in	  the	  Netherlands:	  Descriptive	  Study’	  (2009)	  10(18)	  BMC	  Medical	  Ethics	  	  
31	  Most	  notably	  Oregon,	  see	  E	  Dahl	  and	  N	  Levy,	  ‘The	  Case	  for	  Physician	  Assisted	  Suicide:	  How	  Can	  it	  Possibly	  be	  Proven?’	  
(2006)	  32	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  335	  
32	  Though	  note	  the	  reference	  to	  both	  ‘assisted	  suicide’	  and	  ‘euthanasia’	  generally	  as	  a	  ‘right	  to	  die’	  as	  noted	  in	  Watt,	  ‘To	  
Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21).	  PAS	  relating	  to	  preparation/prescription	  of	  medication	  is	  correctly	  labelled	  ‘assisted	  
suicide’	  in	  English	  law,	  though	  this	  is	  less	  often	  the	  case	  than	  that	  involving	  withdrawal	  of	  life-­‐sustaining	  treatment.	  
33	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  international	  view	  on	  ‘aiding	  and	  abetting’,	  see	  Jason	  D	  Keck,	  	  ‘The	  Demise	  of	  the	  Aiding-­‐and-­‐
Abetting	  Law	  at	  The	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  For	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia:	  The	  Mens	  Rea’	  (2009)	  <	  
http://ebookbrowse.com/jason-­‐keck-­‐aiding-­‐and-­‐abetting-­‐paper-­‐doc-­‐d19973410>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
34	  Hansard	  HL	  vol	  469	  cols	  288-­‐318	  (December	  1985);	  ‘Memorandum	  from	  the	  Attorney	  General’,	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  
Committee	  on	  Assisted	  Dying	  for	  the	  Terminally	  Ill	  Bill	  (2004-­‐05)	  
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/5012004.htm>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	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Commission	  itself	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  accept	  the	  ‘special	  nature	  of	  the	  offence	  
of	   assisting	   suicide’35	   insofar	   as	   it	   treats	   the	   assistant	  who	  aids	   suicide	   as	   a	  
principal	   rather	   than	   secondary	   party;	   a	   defiance	   of	   the	   general	   rule	   of	  
secondary	  liability	  which	  first	  requires	  an	  illegal	  act	  to	  be	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  
principal.	  It	  is	  useful	  for	  our	  purposes,	  therefore,	  to	  regard	  ‘assisted’	  suicide	  as	  
a	  misnomer	  according	  to	  the	  accepted	  rules	  on	  secondary	  liability.36	  
In	  pinpointing	  the	  origin	  of	  ‘assistance’,	  Blackstone’s	  18th	  century	  commentary	  
serves	   somewhat	   in	   establishing	   a	   link	   with	   the	  modern	   laws	   on	   accessory	  
liability:	   And	   it	   is	   likewise	   a	   rule;	   that	   he	   who	   in	   any	   wise	   commands	   or	  
counsels	  another	  to	  commit	  an	  unlawful	  act,37	  is	  accessory	  to	  all	  that	  ensues	  
upon	  that	  unlawful	  act.38	  
Whilst	  we	  see	  the	  use	  of	  ‘counsel’	  up	  to	  250	  years	  ago	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
commanding,	  instigating	  or	  ‘assisting’	  a	  felon,	  it	  is	  here	  advocated	  that	  it	  is	  in	  
fact	  through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  English	  laws	  on	  treason39	  that	  we	  begin	  
to	   fully	   understand	   the	   historical	   use	   and	   interpretation	   of	   ‘assistance’	   in	   a	  
criminal	  setting.	  	  In	  his	  book	  written	  for	  Queen	  Ann,40	  Samuel	  Daniel	  explains	  
the	  demise	  of	  Edward	   IV	   thus:	   ‘[t]hat	   the	  French	  King	  had	   in	  an	   insufferable	  
fashion	  given	  an	  affront	  to	  the	  King	  of	  England,	  in	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  Queen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Law	  Commission,	  Inchoate	  Liability	  for	  Assisting	  and	  Encouraging	  Crime	  (Law	  Com	  No	  300	  CM	  6878,	  2006)	  [B.6]	  
36	  See,	  generally,	  Accessories	  and	  Abettors	  Act	  1861	  
37	  Though	  note	  the	  legality	  of	  suicide,	  as	  above	  
38	  William	  Blackstone,	  ‘Of	  Principals	  and	  Accessories’,	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Laws	  of	  England	  (1765-­‐1769)	  (Routledge	  
Cavendish	  2001)	  Book	  IV	  Chapter	  3,	  para	  2	  
39	  Traceable	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  the	  Roman	  law	  of	  maiestatis	  crimen.	  See	  RA	  Bauman,	  The	  Crimen	  Maiestatis	  in	  the	  Roman	  
Republic	  and	  Augustan	  Principate	  (Witwatersrand	  UP	  1967)	  
40	  Of	  Denmark,	  England,	  Ireland,	  Scotland	  and	  France	  (r:	  1603	  –	  1625)	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Margaret,	  and	  her	  traitorous	  accomplices,	  against	  him’.41	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  
this	  direct	  reference	  to	  ‘aid	  and	  abet’	  can,	  unfortunately,	  only	  be	  traced	  back	  
to	  Daniel	  himself	  in	  around	  1650,	  its	  usefulness	  remains	  twofold	  in	  advancing	  
the	   connection	   of	   ‘assistance’	  with	   treason:	   firstly,	   it	   frames	   the	   notion	   of	  
aiding	  or	  assisting	  in	  a	  criminal	  context42	  (that	  of	  treason)	  and,	  secondly,	  links	  
these	  notions	  to	  a	  modern	  understanding	  of	  accomplice	  liability;	  for	  one	  to	  be	  
‘complicit’,43	   as	   referenced	   in	   the	   1961	   Act.	   But	   this	   is	   an	   insufficient	  
argument	   as	   to	   the	   definitive	   origin	   of	   ‘assistance’	   and	   its	   jurisprudential	  
development,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  emanates	  from	  a	  secondary	  source.	  Let	  us	  
then	   see	   if	  we	  cannot	   strengthen	   the	   claim	   that	  notional	   ‘assistance’	   in	   fact	  
derives	   from	   English	   treason	   laws,	   and	   enquire	   to	   what	   end	   they	   were	  
drafted.	  
We	  shall	  commence	  with	  a	  most	  insightful	  discovery:	  in	  Tudor	  English	  
the	   verb	   ‘to	   comfort’,	   as	  derived	   from	   the	   Latin	   fortis	   (to	   ‘strengthen’),	  was	  
used	   to	   describe	   the	   treasonous	   crime	   of	   aiding	   or	   assisting	   the	   King’s	  
adversaries;	   to	   ‘comfort	   the	   King’s	   enemies’.44	   It	   is	   accepted	   that	   such	  
‘comfort’	   encompassed	   any	   ‘Preparations	   for	   the	   Commencement	   of	  
Hostilities	  against	  the	  King’45	  and	  so	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  term	  was	  intended	  to	  
include	  all	  instances	  of	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  treason.46	  More	  accurately	  framed,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Samuel	  Daniel,	  The	  Collection	  of	  the	  History	  of	  England	  (5th	  edn,	  F	  Leach	  Printing	  1685)	  205	  
42	  For	  a	  tortious	  comparison	  see	  Richard	  C	  Mason,	  ‘Civil	  Liability	  for	  Aiding	  and	  Abetting’	  (2006)	  61	  The	  Business	  Lawyer	  
1135	  
43	  Both	  ‘complicit’	  and	  ‘accomplice’	  share	  lexical	  roots	  in	  the	  Latin	  complice	  
44	  John	  Lawson,	  Introduction	  to	  Christian	  Doctrine	  (Zondervan	  Publishing	  House	  1986)	  116	  
45	  Matthew	  Bacon	  and	  Sir	  Henry	  Gwilliam,	  A	  New	  Abridgement	  of	  the	  Law:	  Alphabetically	  Digested	  under	  Proper	  Titles,	  Vol	  
5	  (6th	  edn,	  Luke	  White	  1793)	  123	  
46	  Lawson	  (n	  44)	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the	   first	   legislated	   use	   of	   ‘aid	   and	   comfort’	   in	   the	   Treason	   Act	   135147	  
categorises	  such	  action	  (or	  inaction)	  as:	  ‘if	  a	  man	  do	  levy	  war	  against	  our	  Lord	  
the	  King	   in	  his	  realm,	  or	  be	  adherent	  to	  the	  enemies	  of	  [said]	  King,	  giving	  to	  
them	  aid	  or	  comfort...that	  ought	  to	  be	  adjudged	  treason.’48	  But	  to	  what	  end	  
were	   these	   laws	   drafted?	   To	   protect	   the	   King	   and	   his	   court	   from	   harm?	  
Undoubtedly.	   But	   to	   encompass	   such	   a	   multitude	   of	   possible	   actions	   and	  
inactions	   as	   (inevitably)	   interpretable	   from	   terms	   as	   broad	   as	   ‘aid	   and	  
comfort’	  goes	  some	  distance	  further	  than	  merely	  preventing	  harm.	  Herein	  lies	  
the	  answer	  to	  that	  question	  of	  ends,	  for	  it	  was,	  quite	  obviously,	  not	  only	  the	  
death	   or	   injury	   of	   the	   King	   or	   Lords	   which	   was	   sought	   to	   be	   prevented	   by	  
these	  treason	  laws,	  but	  the	  mere	  planning,	  encouraging49	  or,	  as	  King	  Alfred50	  
himself	  codified,	  ‘plot[ting]	  against	  the	  life	  of	  the	  King’,	  even	  where	  it	  was	  only	  
the	   plotting	   of	   the	   outlaws	   which	   the	   defendant	   	   knowingly	   harboured.51	  
Synonymously,	   even	   our	   modern	   laws	   do	   not	   require	   the	   presence	   of	   an	  
accessory	   when	   the	   principal	   commits	   the	   offence	   (or	   not,	   as	   established	  
above	   for	   suicide).	   In	   the	   context	   of	   assisted	   suicide,	   this	  would	   render	   the	  
compassionate	  defendant	  liable,	  for	  example,	  for	  preparing	  travel	  documents	  
to	   Switzerland	   for	   the	   principal	   (who	   is	   unable	   to	   do	   so	   himself	   due	   to	   his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Treason	  Act	  1351,	  s	  II	  
48	  The	  King	  v	  Casement	  [1917]	  1	  K.B.	  98,	  headnote	  
49	  Closely	  associated	  with	  ‘procurement’,	  perhaps	  most	  notoriously	  in	  the	  indictment	  of	  Anne	  Boleyn,	  which	  charged	  that	  
she	  did	  ‘procure	  by...kisses,	  touching,	  gifts...the	  King’s	  servants	  to	  be	  her	  adulterers...and	  procured	  her	  own	  natural	  
brother...[though]	  sometimes	  by	  his	  own	  procurement...’:	  15	  May	  1536,	  RO	  876,	  Trial	  of	  Anne	  Boleyn	  and	  Lord	  Rochford,	  
para	  7	  <http://www.british-­‐history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=75430>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013.	  See	  also	  Law	  Commission,	  
Criminal	  Law:	  A	  Criminal	  Code	  for	  England	  and	  Wales	  (Law	  Com	  No	  177,	  1989)	  Vol	  1	  [27]	  
50	  849	  –	  899	  AD	  
51	  ‘The	  Laws	  of	  King	  Alfred	  (r	  871	  –	  899)’,	  S	  4,	  ed	  and	  trans	  FL	  Attenborough,	  in	  The	  Laws	  of	  the	  Earliest	  English	  Kings	  
(Russell	  &	  Russell	  Inc	  1963)	  65	  
The English Laws Relating to Assisted Suicide 	  
	  	  
11	  
crippling	  physical	  state)	  and	  absconding	  before	  the	  final	  deed	  (to	  put	  a	  crude	  
point	  on	  it)	  is	  even	  done.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  surmised	  that	  the	  breadth	  of	  
both	   those	   laws	  on	   treason	  and	  our	   current	   laws	  on	  assisted	   suicide,	  which	  
criminalise	  mere	   ‘assistance’,	   can	  most	   appropriately	   be	   said	   to	   be	   directed	  
towards	  common	  ends:	  the	  protection,	  at	  any	  and	  all	  lengths,	  of	  human	  life	  so	  
that	  humans	  may	  flourish.52	  This	  end,	  it	  will	  be	  discovered	  below,	  is	  the	  most	  
poignant	  constituent	  of	  our	  Divine	  and	  Natural	   legal	  order	  as	  established	  by	  
the	  Eternal	  Law.	  
With	   the	   above	   information	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   noted	   that	   a	   philosophical	  
understanding	  and	  exploration	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘assistance’	  is	   likely	  the	  most	  
useful	   opportunity	   we	   have	   of	   understanding	   this	   term	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
assisted	   suicide.	   This	   is	   only	   supported	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   legislature	   itself	  
remains	   somewhat	   uncertain:	   In	   the	   draft	   paper	   we	   seek	   to	   define	   the	  
elements	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘aiding	  and	  abetting’.	  For	  present	  purposes	  it	  is	  
probably	  sufficient	  to	  say	  that	  ‘aid	  and	  abet’	  generally	  is	  considered	  to	  refer	  to	  
assistance	  and	  encouragement	  given	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  offence,	  in	  this	  case	  at	  
the	  time	  of	  the	  suicide	  or	  attempted	  suicide,	  and	  ‘counsel	  or	  procure’	  usually	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  ‘Eudamonia’	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  Politics	  
53	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Assisted	  Dying	  for	  the	  Terminally	  Ill	  Bill,	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  Examination	  of	  
Witnesses	  (Questions	  2073)	  (20	  January	  2005)	  per	  Rt.	  Hon.	  Lord	  Goldsmith	  QC	  and	  Mr.	  David	  Perry	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‘Lex	  Iniusta	  non	  est	  Lex’54	  
Having	  stated	  that	  English	  suicide	  laws	  are	  founded	  on	  Divine	  Natural	  Law,	  let	  
us	  now	  establish	  an	  evidentiary	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  explore	  how	  this	  foundation	  
has	   influenced	   and	   continues	   to	   influence	   that	   notion	   of	   ‘assistance’	   and	  
prohibitions	  on	  suicide.	  What	  constitutes	  Natural	  Law	  and	  how	  does	  it	  shape	  
our	  suicide	  laws?	  
The	  Latin	  maxim	  above,	   ‘[a]n	  unjust	   law	  is	  not	   law’	  (or,	  an	  unjust	   law	  
seems	  not	  to	  be	  law),55	  articulates	  a	  charge	  through	  natural	  rights	  by	  asserting	  
that	   whilst	   a	   citizen	   is	   obliged	   to	   obey	   just	   laws	   when	   in	   accordance	   with	  
Plato’s	   ‘interest	  of	   the	   common	  weal	  of	   the	  whole	   state’,56	   they	  are	   free	   to	  
depart	   from	   an	   unjust	   regime	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   its	   very	   nature	   (being	  
unjust)	   renders	   it	   a	   mere	   ‘feudality’.57	   Though	   understood	   as	   the	   basic	  
foundation	   of	   the	   stoic	   natural	   lawyer’s	   philosophy,58	   we	   require	   an	  
elucidation	   of	   what	   is	   ‘unjust’	   for	   the	   facilitation	   of	   our	   over-­‐arching	  
examination.	  
The	  most	  succinct	  formulation	  of	  the	  natural	  lawyer’s	  position,	  offered	  
by	   Cicero,59	   is	   his	   categorisation	   of	   ‘higher’	   or	   ‘just’	   law	   as	   true	   law	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  St.	  Augustine,	  De	  libero	  arbitrio,	  Book	  I,	  Vol.	  V	  
55	  Whether	  Aquinas	  incorrectly	  omitted	  ‘to	  me’	  will	  not	  here	  be	  discussed	  but	  is	  duly	  noted.	  See	  Norman	  Kretzman,	  Lex	  
Inuista	  Non	  Est	  Lex,	  Laws	  on	  Trial	  in	  Aquinas’	  Court	  of	  Conscience	  (1988)	  33	  AJJ	  99,	  101;	  Brian	  Bix,	  Jurisprudence:	  Theory	  
and	  Context	  (6th	  edn,	  Sweet	  and	  Maxwell/Thompson	  Reuters	  2012)	  17	  
56	  Plato,	  Laws,	  Book	  IV,	  part	  175b	  
57	  ibid	   	  
58	  Notably,	  see	  Kretzman	  (n	  55)	  
59	  106	  BC	  –	  43	  BC	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agreement	   with	   nature,	   as	   promulgated	   and	   judged	   by	   God.60	   St	   Thomas	  
Aquinas	  goes	  further	  and	  provides	  a	  more	  insightful	  account	  of	  ‘just’:	  a	  higher	  
‘Eternal	  Law’	  which	  operates	  through	  everything	  working	  in	  nature,	  and	  thus,	  
through	  Natural	  Law	  itself.	  This	  Eternal,	  divine	  law	  is	  thus	  imprinted	  on	  us	  as	  
human	  beings,	  as	  creatures	  of	  God61.	  Our	  internal,	  natural	  instinct	  to	  do	  good	  
and	   avoid	   evil	   breeds	   the	   very	   principles	   of	   justice,	   which	   are	   a	   virtue	  
discoverable	  by	  our	  intrinsic	  reason	  as	  rational	  beings:62	  ‘This	  participation	  of	  
the	  eternal	  law	  in	  the	  rational	  creature	  is	  called	  the	  natural	  law.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
evident	   that	   the	   natural	   law	   is	   nothing	   else	   than	   the	   rational	   creature’s	  
participation	  of	  the	  eternal	  law.’63	  
Thus,	  Natural	  Law	   is	  a	   result	  of	   the	  Eternal	  Law’s	  participation	  within	  
man	   in	   essentialibus,	   enabling	   us	   to	   discern	   virtuous	   good	   and	   evil	   through	  
that	   inherent	   reason.	   Therefore,	   anything	   contradicting	   this	   Eternal	   Law,	   or	  
which	   amounts	   to	   contingents	   which	   do	   not	   partake	   of	   reason,64	   is	   a	  
perversion	  of	   the	   law65	  and	   therefore	   invalid.	   Such	   invalidity	   is	   and	  must	  be	  
consistent	   with	   immorality,	   for	   good	   and	   evil	   are	   nothing	   if	   not	   the	  
foundations	  of	   those	  moral	  principles	   inherent	   in	  man	  according	  to	  Aquinas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Bix	  (n	  55),	  referencing	  Cicero,	  Republic	  III.xxii.33,	  in	  De	  Re	  Republica;	  De	  Legibus	  (trans	  CW	  Keys,	  Harvard	  University	  Press	  
1928)	  211	  
61	  Despite	  the	  often	  religious	  appearance	  of	  Aquinas’s	  theory,	  acknowledgement	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  scholarly	  opinion	  that	  ‘taken	  
in	  itself,	  there	  is	  nothing	  religious	  or	  theological	  in	  the	  Natural	  Law	  of	  Aquinas’:	  Thomas	  E	  Davitt,	  ‘St.	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  and	  
the	  Natural	  Law’	  in	  Arthur	  L	  Harding,	  (ed),	  Origins	  of	  the	  Natural	  Law	  Tradition	  (Southern	  Methodist	  University	  Press	  
1954)	  39.	  The	  mistaken	  requirement	  of	  God	  in	  Aquinas’s	  Natural	  Law	  Theory	  is	  perhaps	  best	  explained	  by	  John	  Finnis	  in	  
Natural	  Law	  and	  Natural	  Rights	  (2nd	  edn,	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2011)	  48-­‐49	  
62	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  The	  Treatise	  on	  Law,	  Question	  93,	  Art	  4	  
63	  ibid,	  Question	  91,	  Art	  2	  
64	  ibid,	  Question	  93,	  Art	  5	  
65	  ibid,	  Question	  95,	  Art	  2	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Morality,	   those	   questions	   of	   good	   and	   bad,	   therefore	   permeate	   Aquinas’	  
Natural	   Law	   and	   underpin	   our	   rational	   judgement	   of	   what	   is	   ‘just’	   by	  
presupposing	   that	   an	   immoral	   rule	   is	   also	  unjust;	   not	   a	   rule	   at	   all.	  We	   shall	  
pause	  here	  to	  frame	  Aquinas’	  classic	  theory	  in	  context.	  
One	  of	   the	  most	   fundamental	   rules	  of	   natural	   law	  derived	  of	   human	  
nature	   is	   that	   thou	   shalt	   not	   kill.66	   This	   murderous	   sin,	   prohibited	   by	   God	  
when	   handed	   to	   Moses	   in	   the	   Ten	   Commandments,	   is	   embedded	   in	   the	  
human	   conscience	   and	   is	   most	   certainly	   discerned	   as	   evil.	   Aquinas	   himself	  
addresses	  it	  thus:	  Because	  in	  man	  there	  is	  first	  of	  all	  an	  inclination	  to	  good	  in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   nature	   which	   he	   has	   in	   common	   with	   all	   substances:	  
inasmuch	   as	   every	   substance	   seeks	   the	   preservation	   of	   its	   own	   being,	  
according	  to	  its	  nature:	  and	  by	  reason	  of	  this	  inclination,	  whatever	  is	  a	  means	  
of	   preserving	   human	   life,	   and	   of	   warding	   off	   its	   obstacles,	   belongs	   to	   the	  
natural	  law.67	  
This	  basic	   reading	  of	  Aquinas	  quite	   clearly	  portrays	   that	  preservation	  
of	   life	  or	  human	  flourishing	   is	  good	  and	  so	  we	  ought	   to	  preserve	   it.	   It	   is	   the	  
moral	  content	  (inclination	  to	  good)	  of	  these	  laws,	  inherent	  in	  humanity,	  which	  
determines	   that	   we	   ought	   to	   abstain	   from	   any	   acts	   threatening	   the	  
preservation	  of	   life;	   that	   is,	   that	  ought	  moves	  us	   to	   such	   actions.	   This	  must	  
certainly	   mean	   that	   we	   ought	   not	   move	   to	   action	   the	   extinguishment	   of	  
human	  life,	  even	  where	  only	  ‘assisting’	  such	  an	  act.	  Any	  law	  prohibiting	  such	  
evil	   would	   thus	   be	   advocated	   by	   the	   traditional	   Natural	   Lawyer	  who	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Exodus	  20:13	  (King	  James	  Version)	  
67	  Aquinas	  (n	  62)	  Question	  94,	  Art	  2	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there	  cease	  the	  discussion,	  and	  we	  would	  assume	  that	  he	  or	  she	  could	  never	  
fathom	  the	  notion	  of	  assisted	  suicide.	  	  
Yet	  to	  accept	  that	  this	  Natural	  Law	  formulation	  is	  necessarily	  definitive	  
would	   render	   this	   paper	   redundant.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  
examination	  to	  gain	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  linguistic	  significance	  of	  ‘ought’	  as	  
well	   as	   ‘good’	   in	   their	   moral	   context,	   as	   espoused	   by	   the	   (arguably)	   more	  
progressive	  philosophers	  who	  will,	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  those	  such	  as	  Watt,68	  
evidence	   a	   somewhat	   more	   embracing	   and	   sympathetic	   approach	   towards	  
assisted	  suicide	   laws.	  The	   importance	  of	  such	   insight	   is	  that	   it	  contributes	  to	  
this	   discussion	   the	   idea	   that	   we	   are	   necessarily	   faced	   with	   a	   cardinal	  
obligation	   to	   choose	   between	   the	   lesser	   of	   two	   (apparent)	   evils	   –	   that	   is,	  
between	   allowing	   an	   undignified	   and	   often	   painful	   death	   and	   assisting	   a	  
requested	   and	   ‘justified’	   death	   –	   having	   necessarily	   dispelled	   any	   ideas	   of	  
‘good’	  under	  Thomist	  theology	  in	  allowing	  an	  individual	  a	  right	  to	  die.	  It	  will	  be	  
most	  useful	  to	  discuss	  both	  ‘ought’	  and	  ‘good’	  in	  tandem	  in	  this	  regard.	  
Before	  doing	  so,	  however,	  note	  should	  be	  taken	  of	  Professor	  Finnis’	  so-­‐
called	  ‘new	  natural	  law	  theory’,69	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  paper’s	  focus	  is	  the	  
traditional	   Thomist	   perception	   of	   Natural	   Law.	   Though	   often	   praised	   as	   a	  
welcome	   modernisation	   of	   Aquinas’	   work,	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   Finnis’	  
contribution	  does	  little	  more	  than	  sub-­‐divide	  that	  prominent	  ‘good’	  of	  human	  
flourishing	  into	  several	  ‘basic	  human	  goods’,70	  thereby	  producing	  a	  confusing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	  
69	  See,	  particularly,	  Russell	  Hittinger,	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  New	  Natural	  Law	  Theory	  (University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press	  1989)	  
70	  Craig	  Paterson,	  ‘Aquinas,	  Finnis	  and	  Non-­‐Naturalism’	  in	  Craig	  Paterson	  and	  Matthew	  Pugh,	  Analytical	  Thomism:	  
Traditions	  in	  Dialogue	  (Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd	  2006)	  176	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array	   of	   preordained	   conclusions.71	   Moreover,	   these	   ‘goods’	   he	   separates	  
from	   ‘moral	   values’.72	   This	   necessarily	   convolutes	   the	   ability	   to	   draw	   a	  
sustained	  connection	  between	   ‘ought’	  and	   ‘good’	  due	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   ‘basic	  
goods’	   such	   as	   ‘life’	   are	   necessarily	   separated	   from	  any	   ‘moral	   value’	  which	  
we	   would	   otherwise	   derive	   from	   the	   ‘ought’	   under	   the	   traditional	   Natural	  
Law.	   That	   connection	   between	   ought	   and	   good	   is	   arguably	   of	   lesser	  
importance	  to	  Finnis;	  betraying	  the	  traditional	  Natural	  Law.	  
	  
Moral	  Obligation:	  When	  Knowledge	  Trumps	  Reason	  
Though	  we	  need	  not	  be	  reminded,	  Hart	  indulges	  us	  with	  his	  observation	  that	  
the	  moral	   content	   of	   Natural	   Law	   (inherently	   obliging	   us	   to	   do	   good)	   is	   an	  
‘area	  of	  vagueness’.73	  This	   is	  nothing	  short	  of	  a	  euphemism	  when,	   in	  reality,	  
our	  tendency	  to	  tar	  all	  issues	  remotely	  linked	  to	  morality	  with	  the	  same	  brush	  
(that	  of	  controversy),	  serves	  only	  to	  shroud	  morality	   in	  complete	  mystery	  as	  
an	   altogether	   ‘taboo’	   area.	   This	   is	   most	   conveniently	   evidenced	   by	  
apprehensive	   discussions	   of,	   or	   abstention	   altogether	   from	   debates	   which	  
raise	  points	  as	  morally	  or	  ethically	  sensitive	  as	  racism,	  sexuality,	  abortion	  or,	  
increasingly,	   a	   right	   to	   die.	   This	   is	   only	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   these	  
topics	   also	   exhibit	   some	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   consensus	   in	   society!74	   It	   is	  
really	   of	   little	   surprise	   that	   we	   find	   such	   controversy	   here	   when	   moral	  
precepts,	  if	  we	  accept	  Aquinas’	  view,	  appear	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  Natural	  Law	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  For	  Finnis’	  ‘basic	  goods’	  see	  John	  Finnis,	  Aquinas	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  1998)	  103-­‐129	  
72	  Finnis,	  Natural	  Law	  and	  Natural	  Rights	  (n	  61)	  
73	  Herbert	  LA	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (2nd	  edn,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  164	  
74	  Society	  is	  quicker	  to	  agree	  that	  allowing	  a	  person	  to	  die	  is	  always	  wrong,	  than	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  date	  that	  Queen	  Elizabeth	  I	  
died!	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different	  ways.75	  This	  is	  so	  based	  on	  Aquinas’	  distinction	  between	  those	  good	  
morals	  which,	  by	  virtue	  of	  man’s	  natural	  reason,	  are	  immediately	  recognisable	  
as	   belonging	   to	   the	  Natural	   Law	   absolutely,	   and	   good	  morals	  which	   require	  
further	  consideration,	  wisdom	  and	  Divine	   instruction	   in	  order	   to	  be	  deemed	  
obligatory.76	  Let	  us	  pause	  here,	  for	  this	  is	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms	  by	  the	  Saint	  
who	   earlier	   opined	   that	   human	   nature	   is	   rooted	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   reason	   the	  
good	   from	   the	  bad,	   and	  hence	  was	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  natural	   order	  of	  
things	  as	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  Eternal	  Law.	  To	  introduce	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘wisdom’	  or	  
cognitive	   ability	   to	   appreciate	   ‘instruction’	   fractures	   that	   originally	   objective	  
position	  of	   the	  Natural	  Law	  by	   injecting	  an	  element	  of	   subjectivity,	  and	  stirs	  
something	  uncertain	  at	  the	  core	  of	  this	  ‘higher’	  law.	  To	  clarify,	  both	  divisions	  
of	  Thomas’	   ‘good	  morals’	  maintain	  an	  obligatory	   ‘ought’,	  which	  moves	  us	  to	  
action	   but,	   importantly,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   lies	   in	   the	  
classification	  of	   ‘good’;	   the	   first	  based	  on	  our	  natural	   instinct	   to	  reason,	  and	  
the	  second	  influenced	  by	  wisdom	  and	  therefore	  knowledge.	  In	  effect,	  a	  ‘good	  
moral’	   (according	   to	   Aquinas)	   would	   be	   that	   we	   ought	   not	   to	   assist	   in	   the	  
killing	  of	  another,	  as	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  absolutely	  morally	  wrong	  (as	  according	  
to	  our	  inherent	  reason).	  One	  could	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  this	  is	  an	  analytic	  
proposition	   instilled	   in	   us	   by	   the	   Eternal	   Law	   and,	   as	   such,	   has	   a	   true	  
functionality	   by	   its	   very	   nature.	   Nothing	   more	   is	   required	   to	   discern	   such	  
functionality.77	  Conversely,	  we	  can	  have	  a	  ‘good	  moral’	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  
assist	   in	  the	  killing	  of	  another	  but	   in	  this	   instance	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Aquinas	  (n	  62)	  Question	  100,	  Art	  1	  
76	  ibid	  
77	  To	  be	  discussed	  below;	  analogous	  to	  the	  premise	  that	  ‘all	  bachelors	  are	  unmarried	  men’	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knowledge,	  our	  cognitive	  ability	  to	  consider	  such	  a	  moral	   (killing	  someone	   is	  
bad),	  tells	  us	  so.	  Both	  examples,	  if	  we	  accept	  them,	  tell	  us	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  
to	  assist	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  another	  because	  it	  would	  contradict	  the	  ‘good	  moral’	  
that	  obliges	  us	  not	  to.	  	  
Though	   this	   is	   acknowledged,	   the	   instant	   question	   is	   then,	   ‘what	   if	  
your	   knowledge,	   your	   ability	   to	   consider	   Divine	   instruction,	   differs	   from	  
mine?’	   Indeed,	   such	   a	   conundrum	   advocates	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   subjectivity	  
which	   the	   traditional	   Thomist	   theory	   of	   Natural	   Law	   refutes,	   yet	   which	   is	  
advocated	  as	  a	  more	  realistic	  and	  welcomed	  approach	   towards	  an	   informed	  
understanding	   of	   morality.	   This	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   of	   reformation	   or	  
reinterpretation	  of	  the	  Stoic	  view	  as	  a	  theory	  based	  on	  something	  other	  than	  
reason.	  
It	   should	  here	  be	  asserted	  that	   this	   is	  by	  no	  means	  the	   first	  paper	   to	  
propose	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   knowledge	   necessarily	   influences	   the	   ‘good	  
morals’	  which	  move	  us	  to	  act	  as	  we	  do;	   indeed	  the	  idea	  is	  central	  to	  various	  
Legal	   Positivist	   arguments,78	   but	   it	   is	   not	   a	   proposal	   commonly	   expressed	  
through	   the	   jurisprudence	  of	  Natural	   Law.79	  Hume,	   for	   example,	   states	   that	  
‘Moral	   distinctions,	   therefore,	   are	   not	   the	   offspring	   of	   reason.	   Reason	   is	  
wholly	   inactive,	   and	   can	   never	   be	   the	   source	   of	   such	   an	   active	   principle	   as	  
conscience,	  or	  sense	  of	  morals.’80	  Oh,	  how	  Cicero	  would	  turn	   in	  his	  grave	  to	  
hear	   such	   blasphemy!	  Hume’s	   correct	   statement,	   nonetheless,	   supports	   the	  
plausibility	   of	   an	   articulation	   of	   knowledge	  over	   reason,	   in	   a	   quest	   for	   true	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Such	  as	  those	  of	  Hume	  and,	  interestingly,	  Aristotle	  
79	  Though	  note	  Professor	  Watt	  
80	  David	  Hume,	  A	  Treatise	  of	  Human	  Nature	  (Penguin	  Publishing	  1985)	  Book	  III,	  I,	  I,	  510	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morality.	  With	   that	  being	  said,	   there	  would	  be	   little	  purpose	  to	   this	  paper	   if	  
the	  only	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  is	  that	  Hume’s	  Positivist	  account	  is	  the	  preferred	  
legal	  theory	  over	  Natural	  Law,	  and	  our	  laws	  on	  assisted	  suicide	  should	  simply	  
be	  based	  on	  positive	   law.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  this	  paper	  seeks	  to	  maintain	  that	  
aspect	   of	   the	   Natural	   Law	   which	   permits	   the	   derivability	   of	   an	   obligatory	  
ought	   from	  an	   is,	   in	  defiance	  of	  Hume:	   In	  every	   system	  of	  morality,	  which	   I	  
have	   hitherto	   met	   with...I	   am	   surprised	   to	   find,	   that	   instead	   of	   the	   usual	  
copulations	   of	   propositions,	   is,	   and	   is	   not,	   I	  meet	  with...an	   ought,	   or	   ought	  
not.	  This	  change	   is	   imperceptible...and	   let	  us	  see,	  that	  the	  distinction	  of	  vice	  
and	  virtue	  is	  not	  founded	  merely	  on	  the	  relations	  of	  objects,	  nor	  is	  perceived	  
by	  reason.81	  
Though	   applauded	   as	   a	   welcome	   objection	   to	   the	   premise	   that	   vice	  
and	   virtue	   or	   justice	   are	   necessarily	   only	   perceived	   by	   reason,	   Hume’s	  
rejection	   of	   prescriptive	   statements	   of	   ought	   (in	   the	   context	   of	   moral	  
conclusions)	   leaves	   us	   with	   the	   resounding	   question	   of	   whether	   ‘good’	   is	  
necessarily	   a	   virtue	   at	   all.	   This	   is	   so	   having	   accepted	   that	   ‘good’	   as	   one	  
regarding	   the	   goal	   of	   humanity:	   ‘inasmuch	   as	   every	   substance	   seeks	   the	  
preservation	  of	   its	  own	  being,	  according	   to	   its	  nature’.82	   For	   if	   a	  person	  can	  
only	  find	  descriptive	  value	  in	  a	  virtue,	  even	  through	  their	  own	  experiences	  as	  
Hume	   requires,	   we	   can	   only	   reasonably	   conclude	   that	   they	   have	   attained	  
moral	  sense	  or	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  justice,	  not	  a	  concrete	  moral	  conclusion83	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  ibid	  335	  
82	  Aquinas	  (n	  62)	  Question	  94,	  Art	  2	  
83	  Piotr	  Lichacz,	  ‘Did	  St.	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  Justify	  the	  Transition	  from	  “Is”	  to	  “Ought”?’	  (2008)	  
<http://ethesis.unifr.ch/theses/downloads.php?file=LichaczP.pdf	  >	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	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as	   to	   what	   is	   in	   fact	   just.	   	   This	   cannot	   be	   correct.	   Put	   succinctly,	   Hume	   is	  
correct	   in	   establishing	   that	   injustice/justice	   (‘good’	   and	   therefore	   ‘good	  
morals’)	   is	   not	   only	   discoverable	   through	   reason	   (that	  merely	  metaphysical	  
essence),	   but	   can	   be	   based	   on	   more	   than	   mere	   relations	   of	   objects	   and	  
reason.	  Yet	  he	  goes	  too	  far	  by	  insisting	  on	  the	  merely	  descriptive	  is	  which,	  by	  
its	   very	   nature,	   forbids	   the	   valuing	   of	   facts,	   without	   which	   one	   cannot	   be	  
moved	  to	  action.	  We	  are	  in	  need	  of	  a	  few	  examples	  if	  this	  summation	  is	  to	  be	  
clearly	  understood.	  Hume	  insists	  that:	  
Premise	   A:	   Only	   a	   purely	   factual	   conclusion	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   a	   purely	  
factual	  ‘is’	  statement.	  
Statement	  1:	  There	  is	  a	  cat	  on	  the	  table.	  
Conclusion	  1:	  We	  ought	  to	  call	  this	  a	  cat	  on	  the	  table.	  
Correctly,	  Hume	  insists	  that	  ‘our	  sensations	  are	  strong	  and	  vivid’84	  and	  as	  such	  
I	  am	  able	  to	  conclude,	  through	  the	  wonders	  of	  sight,	  that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  cat	  
on	  the	  table.	  It	  is	  from	  the	  physical,	  factual	  impression	  of	  the	  cat	  on	  the	  table	  
that	   I	  may	  derive	   the	   idea	   that	  a	   cat	   is	   there.85	  My	  sensory	  experience	  with	  
both	  objects	   gives	  my	  conclusion	  validity	  as	  an	   intellectual	   representation.86	  
Additionally,	  Hume	  is	  careful	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  need	  for	  causative	  experience	  in	  
its	   entirety	   if	   we	   are	   to	   fully	   comprehend	   our	   senses,	   which	   enables	   us	   to	  
draw	  a	   conclusion	   from	   it.	  He	  uses	   an	   admittedly	   powerful	   example:	   Let	   an	  
object	  be	  presented	  to	  a	  man	  of	  ever	  so	  strong	  natural	  reason	  and	  abilities;	  if	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  David	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Origin	  of	  Ideas,	  Part	  I’	  in	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding	  (2nd	  edn,	  Hackett	  Publishing	  
Company	  1993)	  
85	  Lichacz	  (n	  83)	  
86	  ibid	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that	  object	  be	  entirely	  new	  to	  him,	  he	  will	  not	  be	  able,	  by	  the	  most	  accurate	  
examination	  of	   its	   sensible	  qualities,	   to	  discover	  any	  of	   its	  causes	  or	  effects.	  
Adam,	   though	   his	   rational	   faculties	   be	   supposed...could	   not	   have	   inferred	  
from	  the	  fluidity	  and	  transparency	  of	  water	  that	  it	  would	  suffocate	  him.87	  
Just	   as	   Adam	   could	   not	   draw	   the	   ultimate	   conclusion	   of	   drowning	  
without	   a	   first	   physical	   experience,	   despite	   his	   sense	   of	   sight	   detailing	   the	  
water,	  so	  too	  should	  I	  make	  a	  physical	  inspection	  of	  the	  cat.	  I	  could	  approach	  
the	   cat	   and	   stroke	   it.	   If	   I	   have	   never	   seen	   a	   cat	   before	   I	   can	   at	   least	   now	  
associate	   its	  purring	  or	   tendency	   to	  knead	  me	  with	  a	  cat	  as	  opposed	   to,	   for	  
example,	  a	  small	  dog.	  	  
Though	   Hume’s	   first	   premise	   initiates	   our	   understanding	   of	   his	  
is/ought	  theory,	  his	  second	  premise	  is	  what	  attracts	  criticism:	  
Premise	  B:	  No	  moral	  obligatory	  conclusion	  can	  be	  draw	  from	  a	  purely	  factual	  
premise.	  
Statement	  2:	  God	  exists.	  
Conclusion	  2:	  We	  ought	  to	  do	  good.	  
From	  my	   inherent	   reasoning	   as	   a	   Christian	   I	   hold	   that	   a)	  God	   exists,	   and	  b)	  
God	  is	  good.	  Based	  on	  ‘Hume’s	  Law’	  I	  cannot	  draw	  a	  moral	  conclusion	  from	  a	  
purely	   factual	   premise,	   whether	   established	   by	   reason	   or	   knowledge	   or,	  
indeed,	   both.	   This	  we	   refute.	   If	   I	   insist	   that	   I	   have	   in	   fact	   experienced	  God,	  
whether	   through	   feeling	   his	   love,	   witnessing	   his	   miracles	   or	   touching	   his	  
creations,	   I	  have	  attained	  at	   least	  a	  sense	  of	  that	  moral	  virtue	  of	   ‘goodness’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  David	  Hume,	  ‘Cause	  and	  Effect,	  Part	  I’	  in	  An	  Enquiry	  Concerning	  Human	  Understanding	  (2nd	  edn,	  Hackett	  Publishing	  
Company	  1993)	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Though	  this	  is	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  reason	  and	  knowledge/experience	  (it	  
is	   not	   suggested	   that	   merely	   knowing	   God	   exists	   through	   reason,	   without	  
sensory	  experience,	  is	  sufficient),	  Hume	  would	  insist	  that	  my	  moral	  conclusion	  
is	   invalid	  due	  to	   its	  nature	  as	  a	  moral	  obligation.	  What	  can	  be	  the	  point	  of	  a	  
moral	  enquiry	  if,	  having	  found	  a	  moral	  sense	  of	  justice,	  we	  are	  not	  obliged	  to	  
move	  to	  gain	  a	  concrete	  conclusion	  of	  it?	  
Despite	  having	  used	  God	  as	  an	  example,	   let	  us	  here	  dispel	  the	  notion	  
of	   religion	  which	   is	   often	   (incorrectly)	   associated	  with	   Aquinas	   and	   adopt	   a	  
similar	  statement	  from	  Aristotle	  regarding	  ‘happiness’.	  It	  is	  important	  that	  we	  
do	  not	  confuse	  this	  discussion,	  pertaining	  to	  the	  Natural	  Law	  and	  our	  human	  
experiences	  within	  it,	  with	  monastic	  arguments,	  for	  the	  Natural	  Law	  does	  not	  
pre-­‐suppose	   the	   existence	   of	   or	   interference	   by	   God.	   Secularism	   does	   not	  
negate	  morality,	   so	   let	   us	   continue	   in	   a	   secular	   fashion	   and	   leave	   religious	  
discussions	  of	  a	  right	  to	  die	  to	  the	  clergy.	  The	  Aristotelian	  maxim	  below	  serves	  
also	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  what	  is	  sought	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  not	  a	  just	  legal	  system	  of	  
assisted	   suicide	   which	   is	   based	   on	   religion,	   rather	   a	   just	   legal	   system	   of	  
assisted	  suicide	  based	  on	  our	  natural	  experiences	  through	  nature.	  
Premise	  B:	  No	  moral	  obligatory	  conclusion	  can	  be	  draw	  from	  a	  purely	  factual	  
premise	  
Statement	   3:	   ‘Happiness	   is	   the	  meaning	   and	   the	   purpose	   of	   life;	   the	  whole	  
aim	  and	  end	  of	  human	  existence.’88	  	  (emphasis	  added)	  
Conclusion	  3:	  We	  ought	  to/should89	  ensure	  happiness.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Aristotle,	  Nichomachean	  Ethics	  (n	  1)	  
89	  The	  adverb,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	  synonymous	  with	  ought,	  is	  irrelevant	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This	  is	  a	  more	  acceptable	  statement,	  yet	  we	  are	  still	  faced	  with	  why	  we	  ought	  
to	  move	   to	  ensure	  happiness?	  Why	  ought	  we	  value	   this	  virtue?	  Though	   this	  
author	   is	   tempted	   plainly	   to	   insist	   that	   there	   can	   be	   a	   no	   more	   blindingly	  
obvious	   statement	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   life	   than	   that	   put	   forward	   by	  
Aristotle,	   ‘happiness’	  must	   be	   evaluated	   and	   explained	   as	   a	   goal	   for	   human	  
existence;	   a	   ‘good’	   and	   therefore	   a	   moral	   justice,	   so	   as	   to	   provide	   a	   solid	  
argument	   and	  dispel	  Hume’s	   error	   in	   claiming	   that	   an	   ‘is’	   statement	   cannot	  
have	  moral	  value.	  It	  follows	  that	  through	  establishing	  such	  a	  goal	  we	  are	  able	  
to	  justify	  our	  ought	  as	  this	  will	  flow	  automatically.	  In	  establishing	  this	  goal	  of	  
happiness,	  we	  could	  start	  simply	  by	  asking	  the	  person	  on	  the	  street	  whether	  
their	  goal	   in	   life	   is	  happiness.	  Though	  even	  the	  pessimist	  may	  find	  that	  their	  
life	   goals	   of	   being	   successful	   and	   prosperous	   are,	   in	   reality,	   manifesting	  
themselves	   in	   a	  mundane	   and	   tiresome	   occupation,	   upon	   further	   reflection	  
they	   might	   admit	   that	   whilst	   these	   goals,	   these	   ‘goods’	   of	   life	   are	   not	  
themselves	   an	   incarnation	   of	   ‘happiness’,	   their	   ‘chief	   goals’	   of	   providing	   for	  
their	  family,	  of	  securing	  a	  future	  for	  their	  children,	  indeed	  of	  buying	  a	  sports	  
car,	  are	  the	  epitome	  of	  the	  happiness	  they	  seek.	  We	  might	  ask	  this	  question	  of	  
a	  countless	  number	  of	  people,	  and	  they	  may	  respond	  that	  their	  goal	  in	  life	  is	  
to	   retire	   in	   the	   sun;	   travel	   to	   exotic	   islands;	   perhaps	   work	   for	   the	   UN	   and	  
promote	  world	  peace.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  regardless	  of	  what	  we	  value	  as	  key	  to	  
our	   happiness	   (and	   therefore	   an	   automatic	   ‘good’),	   whether	   it	   be	   material	  
items,	   charitable	   giving,	   etc.,	   that	   ‘is’	   statement	   is	  what	   guides	   us	   to	   attain	  
that	  descriptive	  happiness	  by	  instigating	  our	  endeavours	  towards	  it.	  With	  that	  
being	  said,	  this	  is	  a	  jurisprudential	  and	  therefore	  philosophical	  paper,	  and	  the	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juris	   component	   will	   no	   doubt	   require	   stronger	   evidence	   of	   the	  
aforementioned	  goal,	  and	  certainly	  more	  than	  mere	  hypothetical	  hearsay.	  It	  is	  
argued	   that	   we	   are	   able	   to	   validly	   assert	   Aristotle’s	   ‘happiness’	   premise	  
through	  our	  ability,	  as	  sentient	  and	  knowledgeable	  beings,	  to	  experience	  and	  
comprehend	  emotion.	  	  
Once	  asserted,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  define	  moral	   justice,	   leading	  to	  the	  
justified	  statement	  that	  we	  ought	   to	  ensure	  human	  happiness	  by	  any	  means	  
possible;	   to	   fail	   to	   do	   so	  would	   be	   immoral,	   therefore	   unjust	   and,	   it	   would	  
follow	   that	   any	   rule	   prohibiting	   such	   justice	   is	   not	   law.90	   Through	   our	   own	  
individual	   epistemology,	   our	   ability	   to	   know	  what	   it	   good	   and	   bad,	   coupled	  
with	   our	   life	   experiences,	  we	   shall	   establish	   that	   ‘happiness’	   pervades	   both	  
living	  that	  life	  and	  ending	  it.	  
Let	  us	  now	  consult	  Poussin	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  add	  prescriptive	  value	  to	  our	  
otherwise	  descriptive	  virtue	  of	  ‘happiness’	  through	  the	  power	  of	  emotion.	  
	  
Authority	  and	  Adversity;	  Poussin’s	  Portrayal	  of	  Emotion	  
In	  accepting	  what	  we	  can	  now	  term	  our	  necessarily	   ‘mechanical’	  and	   largely	  
emotionless	   system	  of	   suicide	   laws,	   it	   is	  worth	  establishing	   to	  what	   end	  we	  
have	   selected	   fine	   art	   to	   facilitate	   a	   rehabilitation	   of	   emotion91	   which,	   it	   is	  
hoped,	  will	  add	  substance	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  happiness	  both	  in	  life	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Accepting	  the	  Aristotelian	  maxim	  above	  
91	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	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death.92	   What	   use	   is	   artwork	   to	   us	   and	   how	   (if	   at	   all)	   are	   the	   emotions	  
captured	  by	  Poussin	  portrayed	  as	  anything	  more	  than	  ephemeral?	  	  
	  It	  will	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  emotional	  justification	  (as	  expounding	  and	  re-­‐
articulating	   the	   Natural	   Law)	   is	   similarly	   advanced	   by	   Watt	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  
correctly	   establish	   humans	   as	   creatures	   of	   feeling.	   Though	   Watt	   employs	  
music	  and	  poetry	  as	  assistants	  in	  his	  thesis,	  fine	  art	  has	  been	  selected	  as	  the	  
vehicle	   of	   understanding	   here	   so	   as	   to	   engage93	   the	   reader	  with	   something	  
tangible	  which,	   in	   agreement	  with	  one	   former	  director	   of	   Le	   Louvre,94	   is	   an	  
opportunity	  we	  must	   grasp	   in	   order	   to	   relearn	   how	   to	   take	   our	   time:	   ‘[w]e	  
have	  lost	  the	  habit	  of	  taking	  time	  to	  study	  paintings.	  We	  look	  at	  them	  in	  the	  
same	  way	   we	   leaf	   through	   a	   book…distractedly.’95	   The	   relevance	   of	   such	   a	  
claim	   is	   that,	   in	   particular,	   Poussin’s	   paintings	   demand	   effort,96	   effort	   to	  
contemplate	  his	  work;	  his	  recounting	  of	  human	  passions.	  This	  must	  be	  done	  
with	  the	  same	  attention,	  concentration,	  reflection	  and	  emotional	  engagement	  
as	   we	  might	   employ	   in	   reading	   and	   absorbing	   a	   text,97	   indeed	   as	   we	  must	  
approach	   the	   subject	   with	   which	   this	   paper	   is	   concerned.	   The	   diligence	  
required	   in	  approaching	  such	  artwork	   is	  advocated	  as	  synonymous	  with	  that	  
required	   for	   assessing	   our	   laws	   on	   assisted	   suicide	   as	   well	   as	   judging	  
associated	  cases.	  In	  following	  Rosenberg’s	  instructions,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  those	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  Aristotle’s	  reference	  to	  ‘life’	  encompasses	  happiness	  to	  its	  end.	  
93	  For	  the	  importance	  of	  engaging	  with	  Poussin’s	  work,	  see	  Andrew	  Butterfield,	  ‘The	  Magical	  Painting	  of	  Poussin’,	  New	  York	  
Review	  of	  Books	  (April	  2008)	  <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/apr/17/the-­‐magical-­‐painting-­‐of-­‐
poussin/?pagination=false	  >	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
94	  Pierre	  Rosenberg	  
95	  Pierre	  Rosenberg	  and	  Keith	  Christiansen,	  Poussin	  and	  Nature,	  Arcadian	  Visions	  (Yale	  University	  Press	  2008)	  6	  
96	  ibid	  7	  
97	  ibid	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with	  a	  genuine	   interest	   in	   the	   jurisprudence	  of	  assisted	   suicide,	  and	   indeed,	  
who	   have	   troubled	   themselves	   to	   read	   this	   far,	   will	   suffer	   from	   an	   acute	  
stirring	   of	   the	   conscience98	   through	   engagement	   with	   Poussin’s	   work.99	  
Particularly	   for	   this	   reason	   landscapes	   have	   been	   selected	   which,	   (it	   is	  
vehemently	  insisted)	  encompass	  the	  most	  ignorant	  and	  organic	  passions	  both	  
of	  nature	  and	  subsequently	  of	  humanity	  (save	  the	  psychopath	  perhaps).100	  It	  
is	   hoped	   that	   such	   stirring,	   resulting	   from	  engagement	  with	  both	  prose	  and	  
art,	  will	   culminate	   in	   a	  more	   informed	   conclusion	   than	   that	  most	   abhorrent	  
conformity.	  	  
Yet	  why	  is	  Poussin	  particularly	  relied	  upon?	  Why	  not	  make	  a	  study	  of	  
landscapes	  by	  Monet	  or	  Lorrain?	  The	  answer	  is	  quite	  clearly	  found	  not	  only	  in	  
the	   essential	   connection	   that	   is	   made	   by	   Poussin	   between	   nature	   and	  
humanity	   but,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   his	   portrayal	   of	   the	   actual	   and	   not	   merely	  
inferred	   existence	   of	   nature	   within	   humanity,101	   which	   is	   experienced	  
throughout	  life	  and	  death.	  This	  point	  is	  pivotal	  as	  it	  is	  this	  existence	  of	  nature	  
within	  every	  person	  which	  evidences	  us	  as	  epistemological	  beings	  capable	  of	  
instilling	   in	   virtues	   a	   value.	   Poussin’s	   dedication	   to	   stoicism102	   and	   his	  
simultaneous	   obsession	   with	   mythological	   texts	   are	   the	   most	   valuable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  To	  borrow	  a	  most	  useful	  expression	  from	  Equity.	  
99	  Our	  failure	  to	  reflect	  on	  our	  existence	  and	  being	  consumed	  by	  what	  is	  happening	  now	  are	  synonymous	  with	  the	  claim	  
that	  the	  tense	  of	  today’s	  age	  is,	  regrettably,	  the	  present	  continuous,	  evidenced,	  for	  example,	  by	  slogans	  such	  as	  
MacDonald’s’,	  ‘I’m	  loving	  it’.	  Rosenberg’s	  comments	  are	  therefore	  applauded.	  	  
100	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	  97	  
101	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  no	  known	  landscape	  paintings	  of	  Poussin’s	  without	  a	  human	  presence:	  Rosenberg	  and	  Christiansen	  (n	  
95)	  187	  
102	  Though	  this	  is	  widely	  accepted,	  see	  Howard	  Hibbard,	  Poussin:	  The	  Holy	  Family	  on	  the	  Steps	  (Allen	  Lane	  Publishers	  1974)	  
43-­‐47	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constituents	   of	   his	   artwork;103	   they	   tie	   so	   usefully	   to	   our	   resurrection	   of	  
emotion	  within	   the	  Natural	   Law.	   Even	  a	   superficial	   study	  of	   either	  Storm	   or	  
Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	  will,	  with	  the	  required	  effort,	  draw	  one’s	  attention	  to	  the	  
human	   characters	   presented	   by	   the	   artist.	   Quite	   abruptly	   they	   offer	   us	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   witness	   at	   least	   two	   emotions:	   anguish	   and	   suffering,	   the	  
undeniable	   offspring	   of	   adversity.	   We	   shall	   commence	   with	   a	   brief	  
examination	   of	   the	   ‘riotous	   nature’104	   of	   Storm	   as	   existing	   within	   humanity	  
before	  moving	   onto	   a	  more	   detailed	   application	   of	   our	   findings	   to	  Pyramus	  
and	  Thisbe	  in	  justifying	  happiness	  as	  the	  chief	  goal	  and	  therefore	  ‘good’	  of	  us	  
all.	   The	   reader	   is	   invited,	   nay,	   encouraged,	   to	   turn	   to	   both	   paintings	  
repeatedly	  throughout	  this	  discussion.	  
For	   the	   sake	   of	   art	   historians,	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   Storm	   was	  
painted	  as	  one	  of	  a	  pair.	  Its	  twin,	  Landscape	  with	  a	  Calm,105	  shall	  however	  be	  
neglected	   as	   we	   are	   here	   concerned	   with	   those	   end	   of	   life	   decisions	   (and	  
indeed	   rights),	   which	   affect	   the	   most	   passionate	   and	   violent	   of	   human	  
emotions:	  love,	  anger,	  suffering,	  and	  fear;	  the	  antithesis	  of	  that	  portrayed	  by	  
Calm.106	  Poussin	  was	   ‘above	  all,	  opposed	  to	   the	  quietude	  and	  serenity	  of	  an	  
impassive	  nature	  –	  an	  eternal	  nature	  –	   to	  a...nature	   “seized	  with	  a	   violence	  
utterly	   like	   that	  of	   the	  human	  passions.”’107	  Storm	  will	   therefore	  be	  used	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  See	  <http://www.artble.com/artists/nicolas_poussin>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  	  
104	  Rosenberg	  and	  Christiansen	  (n	  95)	  261	  
105	  Both	  paintings	  were	  produced	  for	  Jean	  Pointel	  in	  1651.	  The	  former	  is	  currently	  housed	  in	  the	  Musee	  des	  Beaux-­‐Arts,	  
Rouen;	  the	  latter	  is	  displayed	  at	  the	  Getty	  Museum,	  Los	  Angeles.	  
106	  For	  a	  thorough	  and	  moving	  exploration	  of	  this	  landscape	  see	  Timothy	  J	  Clark,	  The	  Sight	  of	  Death,	  An	  Experiment	  in	  Art	  
Writing	  	  (Yale	  University	  Press	  2009)	  
107	  Rosenberg	  and	  Christiansen	  (n	  95)	  261	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establish	  the	  framework	  of	  Poussin’s	  correct	  account	  of	  nature’s	  authoritative	  
existence	  within	   humanity	   and	  Pyramus	   and	   Thisbe	   will	   then	   reveal	   human	  
adversity	   suffered	   when	   rejecting	   that	   most	   natural	   law.	   For	   fear	   of	  
contradiction,	   let	   it	   be	   clarified	   that	   the	  Eternal	   Law	  of	  nature,	   according	   to	  
Aquinas,	  exists	   through	  us	  as	   rational	  beings,	  differing	   from	  that	   raw	  nature	  
within	  us	  as	  natural	  beings,	  which	  Poussin	  portrays	  and	  Hume	  confuses.	  The	  
Thomist	   theory	  puts	   reason	  on	   a	   pedestal	   and	   through	   this	   so-­‐called	   innate	  
ability,	   we	   magically	   discern	   good	   from	   evil.	   As	   discussed,	   Aquinas	   was	  
incorrect.	  As	  natural	  beings	  we	  employ	  reason	  and	  knowledge	  to	  experience	  
emotions	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  moral	  and	  therefore	  just.	  	  
	  
Landscape	  with	  a	  Storm	  
In	   Storm	   we	   are	   confronted	   first	   by	   darkness,	   and	   then	   a	   man	   cowering	  
beneath	   a	   tree	   during	   a	   gale.	   Moving	   across	   the	   canvass,	   framed	   by	   the	  
threatening	   sky,108	   we	   see	   two	   oxen	   and	   several	   shrouded	   figures	   similarly	  
bending	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  nature,	  which	  have	  let	  loose	  and	  dominated	  man	  and	  
beast.109	   In	   this	   context	   the	  word	   ‘dominate’	   is	   importantly	   interpretable	   in	  
two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  we	  can	   take	   it	   to	  mean	   that	   the	   laws	  of	  nature	  constitute	  
humanity	   and	   secondly,	   that	   the	   laws	   of	   nature	   rule	   humanity.	   In	   justifying	  
humanity’s	   emotional	   existence,	   we	   accept	   the	   former.	   In	   advancing	   that	  
humanity	   is	  necessarily	  moved	  to	  happiness	  as	  a	   result	  of	  experiencing	  such	  
emotions,	   we	   accept	   the	   latter.	   Storm	   accomplishes	   the	   first	   of	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  Incidentally,	  the	  original	  landscape	  contained	  a	  fork	  of	  lightning	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  canvass.	  
109	  Rosenberg	  and	  Christiansen	  (n	  95)	  261	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premises.	  How?	  The	  reactions	  of	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  landscape	  validate	  this	  
conclusion:	  the	  man	  who	  throws	  his	  hands	  up	  against	  the	  wind,	  the	  farmer	  on	  
his	  knees,	  the	  figure	  in	  the	  middle-­‐ground	  fleeing	  towards	  the	  sunshine.	  These	  
reactions	   are	  of	   fear.	   Just	   as	  Adam’s	   reaction	   is	   to	   keep	   away	   from	   the	   fire	  
which,	  having	  now	  experienced	   a	  burn,	  he	   fears,	   so	   the	   figures	   in	  Storm	   shy	  
away	   from	   that	   rage	   conducting	   the	   wind	   and	   rain.	   Rage,	   or	   anger,	   is	   that	  
emotion,	  which	  we	  experience	   in	   life	   through	   love,	   loss,	  betrayal,	  etc110	  and	  
which	   therefore	   exists	   within	   us.111	   It	   is	   our	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   of	  
anger,	   its	  destruction,	   indeed	  its	  unexpectedness,	  which	  produces	  fear	   in	  us;	  
for	  fear	  is	  that	  pain	  which	  arises	  in	  us	  from	  the	  anticipation	  of	  evil.112	  To	  avoid	  
risking	   too	   fluid	   a	   statement	   let	   us	   consult	   Adam	   once	   more.	   Suppose	   a	  
person	   had	   never	   experienced	   anger,	   though	   they	  may	   have	   heard	   of	   it	   or	  
seen	  it	  in	  another.	  They	  would	  not	  fear	  it.	  It	  would	  be	  too	  fluid	  an	  argument	  to	  
assert	   that	   based	   on	   mere	   hearsay	   or	   witnessing	   as	   a	   bystander	   a	   person	  
would	  necessarily	  avoid	  or	  fear	  something.113	  Such	  a	  claim	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  Adam	  would	  fear	  fire	  simply	  because	  he	  had	  seen	  or	  heard	  it;	  
indeed	   the	  heat	  and	   light	  would	   likely	  attract	  him.	  He	  would,	  however,	   fear	  
anger	  as	  violent	  and	  unpredictable	  as	  that	  of	  the	  storm	  once	  he	  had	  himself	  
experienced	   it,	   just	   as	   he	   would	   fear	   fire,	   having	   burned	   himself.	   This	  
‘unpredictability’	   or	   unknown	   is	   an	   important	   component	   of	   anger	   and	   our	  
resultant	   fear,	   for	   it	   is	   that	   which	   leads	   to	   an	   anguished	   state.	   Aristotle	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric,	  Book	  II,	  Chapter	  II,	  1378b	  –	  1380a	  
111	  As	  emphasised	  with	  Adam,	  once	  experienced	  we	  retain	  those	  emotions	  through	  memory.	  
112	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric	  (n	  110)	  
113	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  human	  nature	  to	  seek	  such	  an	  experience	  oneself.	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supports	   this	   statement	  by	   reminding	  us	   that	   the	   anguish	  we	   feel	   is	   that	  of	  
uncertainty;114	  our	  distress	  and	  suffering,	  both	  physically	  and	  mentally,	  are	  all	  
part	  and	  parcel	  of	  that	  original	  fear	  and	  anger.115	  
	  
The	   conclusion	   sought	   by	   employing	  Storm	   is	   to	   evidence	   that	   those	  
emotions	  which	  move	   us	   to	   action	   (as	  we	   shall	   see	   below),	   are	   not	   a	  mere	  
product	  of	   internal	   reasoning.	  Based	  on	  that	  Thomist	  assumption,	  we	  would	  
be	   compelled	   to	   conclude	   that	   our	   emotions	   are	   all	   the	   same	   because	   we	  
share	  an	   identical	  ability	  to	  reason.	   Instead	  they	  are,	  and	  must	  be,	  based	  on	  
our	  experiences	  with	  each	  other,	  with	  the	  world	  around	  us,	  with	  nature.	  Every	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric	  (n	  110)	  Chapter	  V,	  1383a	  
115	  Note	  that	  ‘anger’	  and	  ‘anguish’	  share	  the	  Greek	  root	  ankhone.	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person	  may	  experience	  anger	  or	  rage;	  that	  organic	  existence	  of	  nature’s	  storm	  
within	  us.	  Our	  experiences,	  combined	  with	  our	  knowledge	   inevitably	   lead	  to	  
differing	   manifestations	   of	   that	   emotion;	   we	   will	   never	   have	   one	   hundred	  
identical	   answers	   to	   one	   hundred	   questions	   of	   ‘what	   makes	   you	   angry?’116	  
Placing	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  wider	  framework,	  a	  father	  may	  feel	  rage	  as	  violent	  as	  a	  
storm	  when	  his	  child	  is	  killed	  by	  a	  drunk	  driver,	  or	  he	  may	  feel	  such	  rage	  when	  
that	  child,	  suffering	  incontinence,	  ataxia,	  or	  neuropathic	  pain,117	  is	  denied	  her	  
dignity	   in	   having	   her	   loved	   one/s	   present	   when	   she	   chooses	   to	   end	   that	  
ordeal.118	   Both	   situations	   are	   of	   death,	   yet	   anger	   manifests	   itself	   in	  
condemning	  the	  former	  and	  advocating	  the	  latter.	  
Our	   current	   suicide	   laws	   promote	   a	   criminalisation	   of	   our	   emotions	  
(not	   actions)	   which,	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   Poussin,	   we	   can	   now	   clearly	  
appreciate	   constitute	   our	   very	   being.	   We	   would	   not	   incarcerate	   that	   man	  
who,	   for	   love	   of	   his	   daughter,	   shouts	   at	   her	   to	   avoid	   the	   oncoming	   drunk	  
driver.	  That	  child	  is	  not	  suffering.	  Why	  then	  do	  we	  deny	  those	  emotions,	  the	  
very	   sentience	   that	   separates	   us	   from	   beasts,	   in	   criminalising	   in/actions	   of	  
that	  father	  in	  helping	  his	  daughter	  avoid	  suffering,	  which	  could	  be	  as	  little	  as	  
preparing	  her	  travel	  details?119	  This	  study	  of	  our	  emotional	  experiences	  does	  
little	   if	   it	   does	   not	   bring	   home	   to	   the	   reader	   that	   our	   passions	   manifest	  
themselves	   in	   different	  ways.	   This	   is	   of	   course	   the	   core	   difference	   between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  As	  above.	  
117	  Symptoms	  of	  Multiple	  Sclerosis.	  
118	  The	  wishes	  of	  Debbie	  Purdy.	  
119	  Until	  recently,	  requesting	  a	  patient’s	  medical	  records	  may	  have	  constituted	  ‘assisting’	  under	  s	  2(1).	  This	  was	  altered	  by	  
the	  GMC	  earlier	  this	  year.	  See	  J	  Bingham,	  ‘Assisted	  suicide:	  GMC	  signals	  doctors	  safe	  to	  provide	  medical	  records	  to	  
Dignitas	  patients’,	  The	  Telegraph	  (1	  February	  2013)	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reason	   and	   knowledge.	   Just	   as	   that	   father	  would	   not	  want	   to	   suffer,	   for	   he	  
comprehends	  anguish,	  anger,	  and	  pain,	  so	  he	  would	  not	  want	  his	  daughter	  to	  
suffer;	   emotions	   are	   self-­‐determining	   and	   attained	   through	   personal	  
experience.	  
To	  ignore	  the	  proposed	  alternatives	  though	  would	  hardly	  make	  for	  an	  
informed	   discussion.	   So	   we	   implore	   critics:	   if	   not	   death,	   then	   what	   is	   the	  
answer	   to	  my	   loved	  one’s	   suffering?	  The	  automatic	   (and	  arguably	   tiresome)	  
response	   of	   groups	   such	   as	   Care	   Not	   Killing120	   is	   ‘better	   palliative	   care	   and	  
more	  funding	  for	  hospices’.121	  In	  a	  perfect	  world	  such	  care	  would	  ease	  or	  even	  
eradicate	   the	   suffering	   of	   individuals	   such	   as	   Tony	   Nicklinson	   and	   Diane	  
Pretty.122	   The	   hard	   truth	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not.	   Pretty’s	   last	   days	  were	   riddled	  
with	   pain	   and	   fits	   of	   choking;	   an	   end	   she	   feared	   most.123	   Nicklinson	   died	  
blinking	   letters	   of	   communication	   to	   his	   wife,	   dribbling	   incessantly124	   and	  
shunning	   visitors125	   due	   to	  what	   he	   called	   an	   undignified	  way	   of	   living.	   In	   a	  
perfect	   world	   free-­‐flowing	   funding	   would	   finance	   drastic	   improvements	   in	  
palliative	   care	   so	   as	   to	   provide	   a	   realistic	   alternative	   to	   ending	   the	   life	   of	  
sufferers	   who	   wish	   it.	   In	   the	   interim,	   however,	   and	   under	   the	   glaring	  
obviousness	   that	   we	   cannot	   expect	   such	   generosity	   in	   the	   immediate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  <http://www.carenotkilling.org.uk/about/>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
121	  ibid.	  
122	  R	  (Pretty)	  v	  DPP	  [2001]	  UKHL	  61;	  Pretty	  v.	  UK	  (App	  no.	  2346/02)	  ECHR.	  
123	  Though	  Pretty	  sought	  euthanasia,	  her	  suffering	  is	  relevant	  to	  similar	  sufferers	  with	  the	  same	  illness	  seeking	  an	  assisted	  
suicide.	  
124	  Lee	  Stone,	  'Tony	  Nicklinson:	  The	  trapped	  man’,	  BBC	  News	  (August	  2012)	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐england-­‐
wiltshire-­‐19348267>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
125	  Interview	  with	  Gezz	  Higgins	  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐england-­‐19341722>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013.	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future,126	  mere	  calls	  for	  an	  extension	  of	  palliative	  care	  will	  achieve	  little	  more	  
than	  an	  extension	  of	  suffering.	  The	  term	  here	  is	  not	  restricted,	  as	  it	  often	  is,	  to	  
physical	   suffering;	   there	   is	   no	   care	   that	   can	   ease	   the	   anguish	   of	   a	   person	  
locked	  in	  the	  labyrinth	  of	  his	  own	  mind.	  
Our	   emotional	   existence	   as	   facilitated	   by	   our	   natural	   experiences	   does	   not,	  
however,	   explain	   entirely	   how	  we	   are	   then	  moved	   to	   action.	  We	   shall	   now	  
employ	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	   to	  fully	   justify	  that	  second	  premise;	  that	  we	  are	  
moved	  to	  gain	  ‘happiness’	  in	  life.	  
	  
Landscape	  with	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	  
It	   is	   not	   mere	   coincidence	   that	   Pyramus	   and	   Thisbe	   is	   Poussin’s	   largest	  
artwork,	  some	  having	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  describe	  it	  as	  ‘pushing	  easel	  painting	  
to	   the	   limit’.127	   That	   Poussin	   dedicated	   in	   excess	   of	   8000	   inches	   to	   the	  
portrayal	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  infamous	  tragedies	  of	  all	  time	  is	  testament	  to	  its	  
timeless	   relevance	   as	   a	   connector	   between	   humanity	   and	   nature,	   and	   the	  
emotions	   which	   flow	   from	   that	   connection.	   Indeed,	   Poussin’s	   landscape	   is	  
based	   on	   the	   tragic	   love	   story	   from	  Ovid’s	  Metamorphoses	  which	   sees	   two	  
lovers	  (forbidden	  by	  their	  parents	  to	  be	  together)	  run	  away,	  only	  to	  then	  take	  
their	  own	  lives	  due	  to	  a	  tragic	  sequence	  of	  misunderstandings	  (it	  is	  no	  secret	  
then	   as	   to	   what	   inspired	   Shakespeare’s	   Romeo	   and	   Juliet).128	   What	   is	  
paramount	   to	   draw	   from	   this	   painting	   is	   the	   adversity	   suffered	   by	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  2013	  Budget.	  
127	  Clark	  (n	  106)	  102.	  	  	  
128	  Indeed,	  even	  A	  Midsummer	  Night’s	  Dream.	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characters	   in	   their	   outright	   refusal	   to	   obey	   the	   authority	   of	   nature,	   that	   is,	  
that	  authority	  or	  law	  of	  nature	  which	  governs	  love	  and	  therefore	  humanity.	  	  
It	   is	   refuted	   outright	   that	   Poussin	   ‘ignores	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	  
natural	  law	  of	  love	  and	  absolute	  authority’.129	  No	  doubt	  Poussin	  has	  focussed	  
on	   the	   adversity	   suffered	   by	   both	   Pyramus	   and	   Thisbe,	   as	   suggested	   by	  
Batschmann,	   but	   to	   assume	   that	   this	   is	   wholly	   disconnected	   from	   nature’s	  
authority	   is	   and	  must	   be	   incorrect.	   Poussin	   himself	  wrote	   to	   a	   fellow	   artist,	  
Jacques	  Stella:130	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   create	  a	   tempest	  on	  earth...[a]ll	   the	   figures	  
that	   one	   can	   see	   act	   out	   their	   part	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   weather:	   some	   flee	  
through	  the	  dust	  and	  go	  with	  the	  wind	  that	  sweeps	  them	  along;	  others,	  to	  the	  
contrary,	   go	   against	   the	   wind	   and	   walk	   with	   great	   difficulty,	   putting	   their	  
hands	   before	   their	   eyes...others...try	   to	   escape.	   In	   the	   foreground	   of	   the	  
painting	   we	   see	   Piramus	   dead...and	   near	   him	   Thisbe,	   who	   gives	   way	   to	  
grief.131	  
This	  passage	  enables	  us	   to	  engage	   in	  much	  more	   than	   the	  otherwise	  
obvious	  pathetic	  fallacy	  pervading	  Poussin’s	  canvass,	  for	  Poussin	  gives	  us	  that	  
exact	   connection	   we	   seek:	   by	   going	   against	   the	   wind,	   against	   that	  
authoritative	   power	   of	   nature,	   Pyramus	   mistakenly	   believes	   Thisbe	   to	   be	  
dead132	   and	   is	   moved	   to	   kill	   himself.	   Though	   Poussin’s	   landscape	   does	   not	  
capture	   it,	  his	   letter	   to	  Stella	  certainly	  paints	  a	  picture	   in	  our	  minds	  of	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Oskar	  Batschmann,	  Nicolas	  Poussin:	  Dialectics	  of	  Painting	  (Reaktion	  Books	  Ltd	  1990)	  102	  
130	  1596	  –	  1657	  
131	  Quoted	  by	  Pierre	  Rosenberg,	  ‘Catalogue’	  in	  Keith	  Christiansen	  et	  al,	  Poussin	  and	  Nature,	  Arcadian	  Visions	  (Yale	  
University	  Press	  2008)	  264	  
132Upon	  seeing	  her	  bloodied	  scarf,	  believing	  the	  lioness	  in	  the	  background	  of	  the	  landscape	  to	  have	  killed	  her.	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follows:	  Thisbe	  ‘gives	  way	  to	  grief’;	  the	  tragedy	  is	  that	  she	  too	  is	  moved	  to	  end	  
her	  life	  by	  throwing	  herself	  on	  Pyramus’	  blade.133	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  apparent	  joy,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  there	  has	  
been	  any	  movement	  to	  gain	  happiness.	  Admittedly	  so,	  for	  Poussin	  offers	  not	  a	  
‘paint	  by	  numbers’,	  which	   readily	  maps	  out	   the	  essence	  and	  meaning	  of	  his	  
work,	   but	   rather	   he	  hands	  us	   an	  opportunity	   to	   take	   time	   and	  engage.134	   It	  
must	  be	  remembered	  that	  our	  happiness	  takes	  differing	  forms	  than	  that	  most	  
obvious	   joy,	  owing	  to	  our	  different	  experiences	  of	   it,	  as	  well	  as	  our	  differing	  
ethical	  dispositions.135	  There	  is	  a	  philosophical	  opinion	  that	  between	  a	  work	  of	  
poetry	  and	  the	  thinker	  there	  is	  created	  a	  dialogue.136	  Let	  us	  be	  so	  bold	  as	  to	  
borrow	  this	  and	  supplant	  it	  between	  Poussin’s	  artwork	  and	  the	  viewer,137	  for	  
this	  ability	  to	  communicate	  humanity’s	  natural	  existence	  through	  artwork	  is	  a	  
condition	  of	  this	  paper’s	  goal.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  A	  full	  reading	  of	  Ovid’s	  Metamorphoses	  will	  also	  reveal	  such	  a	  conclusion.	  
134	  A	  similar	  attitude	  is	  shared	  by	  GFW	  Hegel	  (1770	  –	  1831)	  who	  also	  advocated	  taking	  time	  in	  philosophising	  about	  fine	  art	  
135	  Generally,	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  (n	  1)	  20	  
136	  Adam	  Gearey,	  ‘Where	  the	  Law	  Touches	  Us,	  We	  May	  Affirm	  it:	  Deconstruction	  as	  a	  Poetic’	  (2005)	  27	  Cardozo	  Law	  
Review	  767,	  773.	  
137	  For	  we	  have	  advanced	  the	  importance	  of	  engaging	  with	  such	  work	  and	  therefore	  thinking.	  




That	   authoritative	   power	   in	   this	   landscape,	   governing	   love	   as	   it	  
governs	  fear	  or	  anger,	  draws	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	  together	  only	  to	  be	  denied	  
by	   their	   parents.	   Let	   us	   call	   this	   the	   ‘paternal	   authority’	   as	   Batschmann’s	  
reference	   to	   it	   as	   ‘absolute	   authority’	   dilutes	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   Natural	  
Law.	  There	  is	  a	  conflict.	  We	  watch	  the	  lovers,	  ambassadors	  of	  Nature,	  battling	  
against	   that	   paternal	   authority	   by	   ‘try[ing]	   to	   escape’,138	   and	   Poussin’s	  
tempest	  encapsulates	  that	  war.	  When	  the	  lovers	  flee	  they	  deny	  their	  love	  by	  
concealing	   it	   and	   therefore	   allow	   the	   paternal	   authority	   to	   triumph.	   That	  
authority	  has	  succeeded	  in	  denying	  the	  Natural	  Law	  as	  being	  natural	  at	  all	  by	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  Batschmann	  (n	  129)	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circumventing	   the	   most	   organic	   emotion	   which	   the	   lovers,	   like	   all	   people,	  
experience.	  Love,	  like	  fear,	  anger	  or	  suffering,	  exists	  in	  us	  as	  the	  storm	  does.	  
Batschmann	   was	   incorrect;	   the	   lovers’	   adversity	   was	   not	   a	   result	   of	  
misunderstanding	   and	  misfortune;139	   these	  are	  merely	  hypothetical	   answers	  
injected	  to	  waive	  the	  value	  of	   love,	  and	  therefore	  happiness.	  Their	  adversity	  
was	  a	  result	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  law:	  the	  Natural	  Law.	  	  
It	   is	  not	  in	  human	  nature	  to	  seek	  adversity.	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	  were	  
denied	  happiness	  by	  the	  paternal	  law	  and,	  as	  with	  Romeo	  and	  Juliet,	  could	  not	  
sustain	  a	  life	  of	  love	  and	  happiness	  on	  Earth	  without	  one	  another,	  so	  they	  too	  
took	   their	   lives.140	   As	   constituents	   of	   our	   being,	   these	   emotions	   rule	   our	  
existence	  and	  therefore	  actions.	  When	  Pyramus	  sought	  Thisbe	  in	  the	  storm	  he	  
sought	  out	  his	  love,	  his	  happiness.	  When	  he	  knew	  he	  could	  never	  experience	  
that	  again,	  knew	  that	  continuing	  life	  would	  be	  an	  extension	  of	  unhappiness,141	  
he	  killed	  himself	  as	  did	  Thisbe.	  The	  lovers’	  actions	  justify	  Aristotle’s	  claim	  that	  
happiness	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  life;	  we	  are	  moved	  to	  attain	  it.	  
We	   have	   therefore	   drawn	   a	   moral	   conclusion	   from	   a	   purely	   factual	  
premise.	  That	  ‘is’	  statement	  has	  gained	  moral	  value	  because	  we	  value	  it	  as	  a	  
goal;	   our	  movement	   towards	   it	   is	   facilitated	   by	   our	   emotional	   existence	   as	  
reflected	   in	   nature.	   That	   ‘good’,	   and	   therefore	  moral	   justice	   of	   the	   virtuous	  
‘happiness’	   is	   permitted	   prescriptive	   and	   not	   merely	   descriptive	   value.	   To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  ibid	  
140	  It	  is	  mere	  coincidence	  that	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe	  depicts	  suicide.	  It	  was	  chosen	  as	  an	  aid	  in	  this	  paper	  merely	  to	  portray	  
humanity’s	  movement	  to	  action	  through	  emotion.	  
141	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	  95	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advocate	  a	  human	  existence	  bereft	  of	  emotion	  is	  therefore,	  without	  doubt,	  no	  
existence	  at	  all.	  
The	  notion	  of	  ‘assistance’	  can	  be	  interpreted	  against	  a	  compassionate	  
background,	   and	   therefore	   leaves	   behind	   its	   mould	   of	   treason.	   Our	   laws	  
prohibiting	  assisted	  suicide	  are	  a	  feudality.	  	  It	  is	  strikingly	  obvious	  that	  genuine	  
time	  and	  engagement	  are	   rare	   in	   this	  area,	  and	   though	   there	   is	  evidence	  of	  
some	   in	   the	   categorisation	   of	   ‘basic	   goods’,	   it	   is	   with	   all	   due	   respect	   to	  
Professor	   Finns	   that	   this	   is	   regarded	   as	   contributing	   little,	   if	   anything,	   to	   an	  
understanding	  or	  justification	  of	  our	  laws	  which	  criminalise	  assisted	  suicide.	  
	  
Common	  Law	  Reasoning:	  Treating	  Like	  Cases	  Alike	  
	  We	   have	   dedicated	   much	   thought	   to	   (and	   directed	   much	   criticism	   at)	   the	  
current	   enactment	   of	   s	   2(1)	   of	   the	   Suicide	   Act,	   and	   have	   poured	   the	  
foundations	  on	  which	  we	  envisage	  change.	  Yet	  we	  have	  finally	  to	  look	  at	  how	  
our	   courts	   have,	   in	   reality,	   dealt	   with	   what	   can	   only	   be	   termed	   ‘tragic	  
cases’.142	   Though	   the	   ultimate	   outcomes	   of	   Pretty	   and	   Nicklinson	   were	  
outright	   denials	   of	   humanity’s	   very	   existence,	   we	   find	   that	   such	   failings	   of	  
justice	   are	   not	   necessarily	   a	   result	   of	   the	   courts’	   inability	   to	   recognise	   that	  
chief	  human	  goal,	  but	  rather	  of	  their	  hands	  being	  tied	  by	  Parliament.	  	  	  
Following	   the	   devastating	   judgement	   in	   Pretty,	   the	   House	   of	   Lords	  
reached	  a	   landmark,	  compassionate	  decision143	   in	  Purdy	   in	  2009	  by	  ordering	  
the	   Director	   of	   Public	   Prosecutions	   (DPP)	   to	   clarify	   the	   ‘facts	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  Nicklinson	  [2012]	  EWHC	  2381	  (Admin)	  [1]	  per	  Toulson	  LJ	  
143	  Surprising	  many	  commentators;	  see,	  eg	  Nick	  Cartwright,	  ’48	  Years	  On:	  Is	  the	  Suicide	  Act	  Fit	  for	  Purpose?’	  (2009)	  17	  MLR	  
467,	  467	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circumstances	   which	   he	   would	   take	   into	   account	   in	   deciding	   whether	  
to…prosecut[e]	  under	  s	  2(1)’.144	  The	  order	  was	  a	  welcomed	  advancement	  on	  
the	   DPP’s	   decision	   in	   December	   2009145	   not	   to	   prosecute	   the	   parents	   of	  
Daniel	  James,	  which	  left	  much	  clarity	  to	  be	  desired.	  Daniel,	  a	  23	  year	  old	  who	  
suffered	  tetraplegia	   in	  a	  rugby	  accident,	   journeyed	  to	  Switzerland	  in	  2008	  to	  
end	  his	  life.	  	  Despite	  his	  parents’	  ‘joint	  enterprise’146	  in	  assisting	  their	  son	  with	  
his	  travel	  and	  Dignitas	  documents,	  and	  a	   ‘realistic	  prospect	  of	  conviction’,147	  
charging	  Mr	   and	  Mrs	   James	   was	   ultimately	   deemed	   contrary	   to	   the	   public	  
interest	  as	  according	  to	  the	  Code	  for	  Crown	  Prosecutors.	  That	  Code,	  however,	  
applies	  to	  criminal	  offences	  generally148	  and	  so	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  Purdy’s	  success	  in	  
obtaining	   a	   declaration	   specifically	   regarding	   assisted	   suicide	   which	   was	  
deemed	  victorious.	  The	  ‘offence-­‐specific’149	  Guidelines	  then	  published	  in	  2010	  
broke	  ground	  by	   listing	   factors	   for	  and	  against	  prosecution.150	  Perhaps	  most	  
interestingly,	   paragraph	   45(2)	   of	   the	   Code	   regards	   assistance	   motivated	   by	  
compassion	  as	  a	  mitigating	  factor.	  
If	   the	  DPP	   is	   then	  willing	   to	   ‘overlook’	   cases	  of	   compassion,	  we	  have	  
surely	  found	  that	  moral	  framework	  which	  we	  seek,	  for	  it	  clearly	  recognises	  the	  
emotional	   existence	   of	   humanity	   and	   acknowledges	   that	   virtuous	   goal	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Purdy	  [2009]	  UKHL	  45	  [56]	  per	  Lord	  Hope	  
145	  <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013	  
146	  Purdy	  [2009]	  UKHL	  45	  [24]	  
147	  ibid	  [26]	  
148	  See	  House	  of	  Commons	  Library,	  Assisted	  Suicide	  (Standard	  Note	  SN/HA/4857,	  2012)	  9	  
149	  Per	  Saimo	  Chahal,	  solicitor	  for	  Debbie	  Purdy,	  <http://www.bindmans.com/news-­‐and-­‐events/news-­‐article/landmark-­‐
victory-­‐for-­‐debbie-­‐purdy-­‐in-­‐the-­‐house-­‐of-­‐lords>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013.	  
150	  Director	  of	  Public	  Prosecutions,	  ‘Policy	  for	  Prosecutors	  in	  Respect	  of	  Cases	  of	  Encouraging	  or	  Assisting	  Suicide’	  (February	  
2010)	  <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html>	  accessed	  1	  May	  2013.	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happiness.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   Crown	   Prosecution	   Service	   (CPS)	   has	   been	  
quite	   clear	   in	   reminding	   us	   that	   ‘the	   case	   of	  Purdy	  did	   not	   change	   the	   law:	  
only	  Parliament	  can	  [do	  that]’.151	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  which	  part	  of	  
the	  Code	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  ‘landmark	  victory’152	  at	  all.	  We	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  
closer	  to	  any	  definitive	  policy	  on	  whether	  one	  will	  or	  will	  not	  be	  incarcerated,	  
despite	   initial	  thoughts	  that	  the	  2010	  Code	  was	  conclusive.	  We	  are	  provided	  
only	  with	  a	  maybe,	  depending	  on	  many	  circumstances.	  Let	  us	  call	   this	  policy	  
an	   ‘Enlightened	   Limbo’	   for	   on	   its	   face	   it	   seems	   to	  provide	   certainty,	   though	  
only	  a	  veil	  of	  obscurity	  materialises.	  What	  then	  has	  been	  accomplished?	  The	  
DPP	   has	   merely	   codified	   what	   was	   already	   somewhat	   accepted	   practice,153	  
whilst	   insisting	   that	   such	   acceptance	   is	   not	   necessarily	   definitive.	   It	   remains	  
that	  whilst	  increasing	  cases	  of	  suffering	  individuals,	  and	  indeed	  their	  families,	  
come	   before	   the	   courts,	   the	   judiciary	   is	   torn	   between	   an	   outdated	   and	  
unethical	   piece	   of	   legislation,	   and	   looking	   to	   the	   DPP	   for	   clarification;	  
clarification	  which	  we	  have	  seen	  fails	  to	  clarify	  much	  at	  all.	  Whilst	  Parliament	  
talks	   idly154	   the	   DPP	   is	   forced	   into	   a	   position	   as	   legislator	   as	   opposed	   to	  
prosecutor.155	  	  
The	   lack	   of	   dedicated	   engagement	   with	   this	   subject	   renders	  
Parliament’s	  actions,	  and	  therefore	  the	  Suicide	  Act,	  unjust.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  
Natural	  Lawyer	  we	  see	  an	  ignorance	  of	  humanity’s	  true	  emotional	  and	  natural	  
existence	  which	  side-­‐lines	  the	  valuing	  of	  life	  itself.	  Both	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  CPS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  ibid,	  para	  5	  
152	  Above	  n	  149	  
153	  Cartwright	  (n	  143)	  474	  
154Rejecting	  Lord	  Joff’s	  Bill	  and	  Lord	  Falconer’s	  Bill	  particularly.	  
155	  Cartwright	  (n	  143)	  474	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have	  exhausted	  their	  powers	  of	  recognising	  that	  true	  virtue	  of	  happiness,	  and	  
until	  Parliament	  steps	  up	  to	  meet	  their	  ambitions	  with	  binding	  law,	  suffering	  
individuals	  cannot	  be	  sure	  of	  the	  fate	  of	  their	  assistants	  when	  they	  choose	  to	  
end	  their	  lives.	  That	  compassion	  alone	  would	  see	  that	  sufferer	  continue	  their	  
ordeal	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  another.	  
Though	  we	  see	  some	  consistency	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  these	  cases,	  there	  
is	   no	   guarantee	   as	   to	   this	   continuation.	   The	   Suicide	  Act	   bears	   down	  on	   the	  
courts	  as	  the	  paternal	  love	  bore	  down	  on	  Pyramus	  and	  Thisbe;	  it	  conflicts	  with	  
the	  Natural	  Law	  (emotions)	  of	  the	  presiding	  judges	  and	  restrains	  true	  morality	  
and	  therefore	  justice.	  
	  	  
Conclusion	  
Philosophy	   is	   not	   an	   idle	   study.	   We	   cannot	   look	   to	   our	   laws	   prohibiting	  
assisted	   suicide	   and	   through	   a	   nonchalant	   reading	   gauge	   their	  morality	   and	  
therefore	   legality,	  the	  two	  being	   inextricably	   linked.	  Even	  to	  open	  our	  minds	  
and	   listen	   to	  both	   the	   campaigners	   for	   and	  against	   this	   right	  does	  not	  do	   it	  
justice.	   Philosophy	   is	   an	   activity,	   an	   engagement,	   an	   experience.	   That	   such	  
involvement	   is	   lacking	   is	   blindingly	   obvious	   upon	   a	   finding	   that	   ‘physician-­‐
assisted	   suicide’,	   correctly	   defined	   as	   euthanasia,	   is	   mistaken	   for	   assisted	  
suicide	  again	  and	  again.156	  Those	  philosophers,	  academics	  and	  legislators	  who	  
condemn	   this	   right	   to	   die	   readily	   import	   the	   conclusion	   that	   all	   forms	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Hugh	  V	  McLachlan,	  ‘Assisted	  Suicide	  and	  the	  Killing	  of	  People?	  Maybe.	  Physician-­‐Assisted	  Suicide	  and	  the	  Killing	  of	  
Patients?	  No:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Shaw’s	  New	  Perspective	  on	  Euthanasia’	  (2010)	  36	  JME	  310	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suicide	   are	   immoral	   and	   therefore	   illegal.157	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   this	   problem	   is	  
that	  these	  distinguished	  men	  and	  women	  are	  in	  fact	  talking	  past	  each	  other.	  
They	  have	   lost	   sight,	   firstly	  of	  what	  notional	   ‘assistance’	   truly	  means,158	  and	  
secondly	  of	  humanity’s	  existence	  as	  an	  emotional	  being.159	  They	  have	  failed	  to	  
take	   the	   required	   time	   and	   effort.	   There	   is	   no	   consensus	   of	   what	   aiding,	  
abetting,	   counselling	   or	   procuring	   suicide	   truly	   encompasses,160	   nor	   is	   there	  
any	   apparent	   drive	   to	   establish	   one.	   Where	   are	   the	   discussions	   of	   the	  
jurisprudence	   of	   ‘assisted’	   suicide	   as	   defined	   in	   English	   law?	   We	   are	  
confronted	  by	  a	  glaring	  academic	  gap,	  exacerbated	  only	  by	  extra-­‐jurisdictional	  
conundrums.	   Additionally,	   there	   is	   insufficient	   homage	   paid	   to	   humanity	   as	  
something	  other	  than	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  being.161	  Dictates	  of	  what	  is	  ‘good’162	  
for	  us	   impose	  on	  us	   all	   a	   set	  of	   standards	  demanded	  by	   those	  out	  of	   touch	  
with	  our	  very	  existence.	  And	  so	  is	  the	  object	  of	  this	  enquiry.	  Until	  such	  further	  
engagement	   with	   life	   experiences,	   insufficient	   differentiation	   between	  
paramount	   notions	   and	   concepts	   renders	   our	   laws	   both	   pernicious	   and	  
manifestly	  unjust.	  	  
This	   paper	   does	   not	   advocate	   the	   simple	   adoption	   of	   systems	   of	  
legalised	  assisted	  dying	  from	  jurisdictions	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands	  or	  Oregon.	  
It	  advocates	  an	  adoption	  of	  a	  system	  legalising	  the	  assisting	  of	  suicide	  on	  the	  
grounds	  of	  emotion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  Notably	  Finnis,	  Aquinas,	  Hume,	  Professor	  David	  Currow,	  Professor	  Tim	  Maughan	  and	  Lady	  Campbell.	  
158	  A	  complete	  and	  utter	  misnomer	  in	  the	  context	  of	  suicide,	  as	  discussed.	  
159	  Being	  completely	  absent	  from	  our	  legislation.	  
160	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  (n	  53)	  
161	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	  91	  
162	  With	  particular	  reference	  to	  Professor	  Finnis.	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Though	  dignity	  and	  autonomy	  are	  convincing	  defences	  raised	  by	  many,	  
we	  need	  not	   look	  much	  further	  than	  the	  compassion	  within	  us	  to	  know	  that	  
our	   suicide	   laws	   deny	   something	   natural.	   Yes,	   dignity	   is	   infringed.	   Yes,	  
autonomy	   is	   denied.	   But	   looking	   even	   closer	   to	  home,	  within	  ourselves	   and	  
our	   engagement	   with	   nature,	   we	   find	   that	   these	   laws	   impede	   our	   very	  
existence.	  Our	   laws	  do	  not	  protect	  those	  suffering,	  they	  condemn	  them	  to	  a	  
life	   of	   extended	   suffering.163	   Though	   this	   subject	   warrants	   and	   indeed	  
deserves	   continuous	   debate	   and	   statutory	   reform,	   this	   study	   is	   now	  
accomplished	  and	  so	  ought	  to	  end.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  For	  a	  recommended	  draft	  Act,	  see	  Watt,	  ‘To	  Everything	  There	  is	  a	  Season’	  (n	  21)	  112	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